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Executive Summary 
This report presents the findings of a survey on illegitimate economic practices in 
Croatia conducted between August and October 2015. This representative survey of 
2,000 citizens focused on the experiences of Croatians with undeclared work, 
envelope wages and the practice of ‘pulling strings’, as well as on their opinion 
about these types of dishonest behaviour. 
According to the respondents, violating practices are strongly ingrained in Croatian 
society. For instance, almost six out of ten  respondents were certain that at least one 
in five citizens regularly violates tax and labour laws. The most important reasons are 
believed to be the lack of formal employment opportunities and insufficient income 
from regular employment 
When it comes to the use of personal connections in order to circumvent rules and 
procedures, 86.4% of Croatians perceive this particular type of misbehaviour as 
important or very important for achieving certain goals in Croatia. Moreover, one in 
nine citizens has a positive attitude towards this illegitimate practice, while a further 
three in ten are neutral in their attitude towards such practices. It is thus unsurprising 
that there is a high prevalence of these illicit activities.  
The survey reveals that 16% of Croatians acquire goods from the undeclared 
economy, 20% pay for undeclared services, 9.2% of employees are employed without 
a work contract, 6.6% of registered dependent employees earn more than is stated in 
their contract, 30.8% of Croatians rely on illegitimate help/favours from people, and 
that 20.2% of the population provides such help/favours. However, these should all be 
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treated as lower-bound estimates, given that surveys tend to under-report participation 
when sensitive issues are being investigated. 
Analysing involvement in undeclared work, nevertheless, the findings reveal that tax 
morale and personal views on the extent to which others participate are key 
determinants. The lower one’s tax morale, the higher the propensity to participate in 
the undeclared economy (and this applies to both the demand and supply sides). 
Likewise, the higher is the perceived number engaged in such activity, the stronger is 
one’s personal inclination towards such behaviour.  
Undeclared work is found to be particularly prevalent in agriculture and the 
construction industry. More than one third of the informal buyers had purchased 
agricultural products (milk, meat, crops, fruits, etc.) without a receipt over the 12 
months prior to the survey, while three out of ten admitted to having hired an 
undeclared individual for home repair and maintenance tasks. On the supply-side, 
21.4% of those reporting participation in undeclared work had provided home repair 
and renovation services, while 8.5% were selling agricultural products.  
Social ties play an essential role in unregistered economic transactions in Croatia. 
Every second undeclared transaction in Croatia is with a close social relation. 
Primarily, these are friends, colleagues and acquaintances, rather than relatives and 
neighbours. Presumably, these two latter groups are seldom compensated for their 
contribution, i.e. their involvement can be characterised as unpaid assistance. This 
finding that undeclared work is often conducted for close social relations is also 
reflected in the fact that one in three undeclared workers described their actions as 
being motivated by a desire to help people rather than for economic gain. Indeed, 
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one third of the providers of informal goods and services asserted that this is a 
normal way of operating.  
The undeclared economy in Croatia thus seems to be a parallel universe to the 
declared economy, offering a similar range of goods and services but for a lower 
price than the formal market, with this being identified as the most important 
motivation by purchasers of undeclared goods and services. This was also confirmed 
on the supply side; 32.1% of undeclared workers admitted that mutual financial 
benefit of both parties was a key reason to conceal the transaction from the 
authorities. In addition, every fourth individual was engaged in unregistered activities 
simply due to the lack of formal employment, which therefore indicates that 
undeclared work indeed has an important role in making ends meet for many 
individuals in Croatia. This in large part explains why unemployed and self-employed 
individuals are more likely to work undeclared in Croatia than other occupational 
groups.  
Agriculture and construction are also top of the list of sectors with regard to the 
prevalence of envelope wages in Croatia, with 28.3% and 16.1% respectively of the 
formal workforce in these two sectors receiving more than they report to the 
authorities. As in the case of completely undeclared work, tax morale and the 
perceived commonality of undeclared work (i.e., the lack of vertical and horizontal 
trust) are key determinants of envelope wage practices in Croatia.  
Under-declaration of wages in Croatia is most commonly instigated by the employer 
in seven out of ten illegitimate unwritten agreements identified. Indeed, this type of 
noncompliance seems to primarily serve as an efficient tax and social contribution 
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evasion strategy for employers. In general, under-reporting of wages was found to be 
most common among new entrants to the labour market. 
Analysing pulling strings to get things done, the survey reveals that Croatians most 
often circumvent procedures related to medical services, with 17% of participants 
admitting to having relied on personal connections in order to skip a queue for a 
hospital, to get a better medical examination or to shorten the waiting time for 
surgery at least once in the last 12 months. Croatians also heavily rely on pulling 
strings searching for a job, as well as when seeking services at a better quality or 
better price.  
Almost 60% of participants requested friends to pull strings for them, while 30% used 
relatives. This explains why pulling strings in Croatia is rarely a monetary transaction, 
given that in most cases either only verbal gratitude was expressed to the provider of 
the favour/help, or the favour was returned later. In general, younger people are far 
more likely to provide or use such favours than older generations, while there is no 
significant difference between genders in this respect.  
Analysing how illegitimate practices can be tackled, Croatians do not believe that 
increased penalties for violators would be an effective approach, and the same 
applies to awareness raising campaigns alone. Instead, the prevalent opinion is that 
undeclared work in Croatia cannot be reduced without improving the psychological 
contract between the authorities and citizens (i.e., vertical trust), and this should be 
done first and foremost by changing formal institutions. Citizens widely believe that 
there is a need for a change in the way in which enforcement agencies treats citizens. 
This primarily refers to more collaboration and less coercion on the part of the 
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inspectors, as well as the provision of equal treatment across all groups of citizens. 
Finally, citizens believe that ensuring a sense of fair treatment in public and 
government institutions would reduce the use of personal connections.  
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1 Introduction  
There has been a growing interest in comprehending the causes and nature of the 
economic activities by companies and individuals that remain ‘hidden’ from the 
authorities (Sauka et al., 2016; Williams, 2016a,b, 2017; Williams and Schneider, 2016). 
This issue has particularly come to the fore after the onset of the economic downturn 
in 2009, which caused substantial drops of public budget revenues (Andrews, Caldera 
Sánchez, & Johansson, 2011; CSD, 2011; Dekker, Oranje, Renooy, Rosing, & Williams, 
2010; Eurofound, 2013; Williams, 2014a,b,c; Williams and Schneider, 2016). Large fiscal 
deficits have forced governments around Europe to start actively seeking for efficient 
policy measures that would discourage economic subjects from various forms of tax 
evasion (Dekker et al., 2010; Eurofound, 2013; Williams & Nadin, 2012b; Williams, 
Windebank, Baric, & Nadin, 2013). To enhance collaboration of the member states in 
this respect, the European Commission established the European Platform Tackling 
Undeclared Work in May 2016 (European Commission, 2016). Additionally, the 
Commission has been actively supporting a range of research projects studying the 
roots of this phenomenon in Europe. 
This report presents the most important findings from one such program which is 
focused on three South-East European economies facing a high social embeddedness 
of noncompliant behaviour. The IAPP project titled ’GREY - Out of the shadows: 
developing capacities and capabilities for tackling undeclared work in Bulgaria, 
Croatia and FYR Macedonia’ aims at providing well-founded recommendations to 
policy-makers in these three countries so as to more efficiently combat illegitimate 
economic practices (European Commission, 2013).  
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Apart from substantial structural problems, which are primarily reflected through 
inefficient state apparatus, weak rule of law and prevalent corruption in the public 
sector, the roots of tax evasion in these three countries can also be found in pervasive 
unemployment (Bejaković, 2012; CSD, 2011; Dzhekova & Williams, 2014; Eurostat, 
2016b; Transparency International, 2015; Williams, Franic, & Dzhekova, 2014; World 
Bank, 2015). According to estimates by Schneider (2016), illegitimate economic 
activities in Croatia and Bulgaria account for 27.1% and 30.2% of the GDP 
respectively, which places them at the top with regard to the prevalence of this 
phenomenon in the EU. The disobedience with tax and labour regulation is even more 
prevalent in FYR Macedonia, given that one third of the official GDP remains hidden 
from the authorities in this EU-candidate country (Schneider, Buehn, & Montenegro, 
2010).  
To get rigorous evidence on the mechanisms underlying hidden economic activities in 
the given countries, two separate questionnaire surveys were conducted in each 
country1. The first surveyed individuals and their activities, while the second explored 
unregistered economic practices by companies. This report provides an insight into 
individual-level aspects of the phenomenon in Croatia by reporting the first survey, 
which was based on a representative survey of 2,000 households conducted between 
August and October 20152. The main aim of this particular survey, whose detailed 
description is given later in this chapter, was to determine which demographic and 
                                                          
1 Yet, the endeavours to understand the causes and nature of 'hidden activities' were not limited solely to 
these six surveys. For information on other activities within the GREY project see http://www.grey-
project.group.shef.ac.uk/. 
2 This is just one of several different reports prepared in this respect. Other reports can be found at: 
http://www.grey-project.group.shef.ac.uk/.  
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socio-economic groups in Croatia are more likely to carry out illegitimate economic 
activities, as well to understand their rationales for doing so. In addition, the idea was 
to evaluate the attitudes of citizens towards various types of noncompliant behaviour 
and their reasoning as policy-takers regarding the most effective strategies to reduce 
disobedience with labour and tax legislation.  
It is, however, important to state that our inquiry into hidden economic practices was 
limited solely to the two groups of activities widely recognised as having detrimental 
influence on economic and social climate in the country. The first group of activities, 
which is commonly known under the name ‘undeclared work’, connotes “any paid 
activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not declared to the public 
authorities, taking into account differences in the regulatory system of Member 
States” (European Commission, 1998, p. 4). Undeclared work thus embraces all paid 
activities that deliberately remain concealed so as to evade taxes and/or social 
security contributions or simply to circumvent labour legislation, but are completely 
legitimate in all other respects. This implies that criminal activities (such as human 
trafficking, drug smuggling and prostitution) are not included, and the same applies 
to unpaid activities (self-provisioning, volunteering, unpaid community work, etc.). 
Besides undeclared work, the survey also studied another type of dishonest 
behaviour, which can be defined as “the use of personal networks for obtaining 
goods and services in short supply, or for circumventing formal procedures” 
(Ledeneva, 2013, p. 273). This particular phenomenon is known under various names 
in the literature: in post-soviet countries it is denoted as ‘blat’, while in the Arab 
word it is called ‘wasta’ (Eng. Going in between) (Onoshchenko & Williams, 2013). 
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In China, meanwhile, it is referred to as ‘guanxi’ (Eng. Connections), while in Brazil 
this practice is termed ‘jeitinho’ (Eng. Little way out)3. Leaving aside minor 
differences between these terms, throughout this report we will denote this 
phenomenon as ‘pulling strings’, which is the most common name for this practice 
in the English-spoken word. In the context of the report, ‘pulling strings’ denotes 
the practice of relying on personal connections (i.e. help from relatives, friends, 
colleagues or acquaintances) to obtain goods and services outside formal means of 
conduct in different spheres of life, regardless of the reward/compensation that 
accompanies the arrangement. Thus, we do not distinguish between paid favours and 
those that do not entail monetary transaction, given that the primary emphasis is on 
understanding motivations of people to engage in this practice, not on the exact 
nature of the agreement between the stakeholders involved. 
In the rest of this chapter, therefore, we first give a short overview of the economic 
situation in Croatia, the newest EU member state which is the focus of this report. This 
chapter concludes with a brief description of the representative survey of 2,000 
Croatian citizens, whose results are then presented in Chapters 2-7. To evaluate 
illegitimate economic practices in Croatia, we commence with an elaboration on 
taxpayers’ perceptions in this respect, primarily regarding the prevalence of 
undeclared work, the role of pulling strings in everyday life, the effectiveness of 
repressive endeavours by the authorities and tolerance towards various types of 
misbehaviour. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the demand side of undeclared 
work in Croatia, while discussion about envelope wage practices in this South-East 
European country is given in Chapter 4. The insight into undeclared work is 
                                                          
3 For more detailed discussion on this matter see Onoshchenko and Williams (2013). 
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completed in Chapter 5, which reports the most important findings on the supply side 
of this phenomenon. Chapter 6 then elaborates on the causes and nature of pulling 
strings practices, both from the demand and supply side. The report ends with the 
overview of taxpayers’ opinions regarding the most effective policy strategies to 
combat noncompliant behaviour in Croatia. 
1.1 Croatia – slow transition encumbered by numerous structural problems 
At the moment of its accession to the EU in July 2013, Croatia was nowhere near the 
average of the remaining 27 member states in terms of its economic development 
(Eurostat, 2017a). With GDP per capita amounting to € 10,200 at the time, this newest 
member state joined Romania and Bulgaria at the bottom of the list in this respect 
(Eurostat, 2017a). Not much has changed since then, as Croatia was among the last of 
the European economies to overcome the economic crisis (Eurostat, 2017b). This 
youngest member state also occupies some of the lowest positions in the EU in many 
other vital fields, such as its employment rate, government effectiveness, judiciary 
independence, public sector corruption and trust in public institutions (European 
Commission, 2007; Eurostat, 2016a; Transparency International, 2017; World Bank, 
2015).  
The essential roots of the current state of affairs in this South-East European country 
can be traced back to the chaotic initial phase of the transition (Bejaković, 2009; Franic 
& Williams, 2014). Namely, the collapse of the socialist regime in Croatia entailed not 
only the need for transformation to the capitalist market, but also the battle for 
independence. In such circumstances, the primary interest of political elites and the 
wider public during the first half of the 1990s was on the ongoing war, which resulted 
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in many illegitimate activities related to the privatisation of public companies staying 
under the radar (Franičević, 1997). This initial period of transformation in Croatia, 
which is often denoted as ‘wild capitalism’, was a fertile ground for various interest 
groups to acquire substantial assets in the privatisation process under non-
transparent transactions, as well as for the development of many dishonest economic 
and social practices (Čučković, 2002; Šundalić, 1999).  
Corruption was certainly one of the most prevalent such practices, given that it had 
become a standard ‘modus operandi’ in Croatia by the end of the millennium 
(Šundalić, 1999). Accompanied with growing reliance on personal connections to 
solve everyday issues with the public administration, this state of affairs entailed a 
substantial decline of trust in the state institutions. This eventually weakened the 
psychological contract between the state and citizens, thus increasing occurrences of 
tax evasion out of defiance (Bejaković, 2009; Franic & Williams, 2014; Williams & 
Franic, 2015). 
Moreover, the 1990s were characterised by a considerable reduction of employment, 
which brought many people to the edge of poverty, thus forcing them to find 
alternative income earning strategies (Crnković-Pozaić, 2002; Karajić, 2002). In such a 
situation, many used undeclared work as the only way to make ends meet. However, 
this initial phase of transformation passed without any significant effort of the 
government to tackle the phenomenon. One possible explanation for this lack of the 
response is that the authorities might actually have been tacitly approving of 
undeclared work during that period since it represented an important cushion for the 
economic problems that the country faced at the time. 
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Yet, the start of the new millennium brought a renaissance of the Croatian economy, 
which further postponed development of a strategic approach towards the eradication 
of this practice. This issue also fell out of the interest in the academic community, which 
invested praiseworthy efforts to comprehend the roots of this multifaceted 
phenomenon during the late 1990s (see Ott, 2002). This lack of interest enabled 
illegitimate economic practices to gradually become a standard way of operating in 
this South-East European country during the mid-2000s, as according to Schneider 
(2016) the official estimates of GDP during the pre-crisis period were underestimated 
by almost one third of its value due to hidden activities (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1 Shadow economy in Croatia for the period 2003-2016, % of the official GDP 
 
Note: Shadow economy in this context assumes all “legal business activities that are performed 
outside the reach of government authorities” (Schneider, 2013, p. 3), thus matching the scope 
of activities analysed in this report 
Source: Schneider (2016) 
It was not until the onset of the economic downturn that the issue of the undeclared 
economy in Croatia received attention in public and political circles. Since then, a lot 
has been done to reduce the occurrence of noncompliant behaviour in this South-
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East European country (see Franic & Williams, 2014; Williams & Franic, 2015, 2016a; 
Williams et al., 2013). The breaking moment in this respect was the accession to the 
EU, which actually represented the start of systematic approach towards solving this 
problem. For instance, Croatia was included in the last wave of the Special 
Eurobarometer Survey on undeclared work conducted in 2013, which was the first 
comprehensive insight into the issue in this country (European Commission, 2014).  
The results of this particular survey revealed that 7% of the Croatian citizens were 
working on an undeclared basis in 2013, while 17% were purchasing goods and 
services off-the-books (European Commission, 2014). These shares were much higher 
than in most other member states, which explains the high interest of the European 
Commission in combating undeclared work in Croatia. 
Indeed, the Commission has invested substantial efforts in this respect, not only by 
enabling Croatian authorities to exchange experience with other member states4, but 
also by providing a significant fund for researchers and policy-makers to explore the 
complex mechanisms behind the phenomenon. As already mentioned, this report is 
an outcome of one such research project, which seeks to fill the substantial gaps in 
knowledge about the causes and nature of the hidden economic activities in Croatia. 
The recommendations given within the GREY project are heavily based on a 
representative survey of 2,000 individuals and a survey of 521 companies. This report 
                                                          
4 Besides participation in servicing the European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work, the policy experts 
in Croatia are also involved in the twinning project ‘Strengthening Policy and Capacities to Reduce 
Undeclared Work’. The main aim of the project, which is jointly conducted by the Ministry of Labour and 
Pension System of Croatia, Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic, Federal 
Ministry of Finance of the German Republic and Regional Development Agency of the Slovak Republic, is to 
develop an efficient strategy to tackle undeclared work in Croatia (http://www.mrms.hr/svecano-
predstavljanje-twinning-projekta-jacanje-politike-i-kapaciteta-za-suzbijanje-neprijavljenoga-rada/) 
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summarises the most important findings from the first of the two. Before moving to the 
results, we shall give a description of the questionnaire and the sampling strategy 
applied. 
1.2 Representative survey of 2,000 individuals in Croatia – a brief description 
The household survey comprised a total of 56 questions divided into seven thematic 
areas. In this section we only provide a broad overview of the matters discussed with 
the surveyed individuals, while the exact wording of questions will be given through 
the report along with the summary of the results.  
Given the sensitivity of the issue scrutinised, the idea was to start with some general 
questions in order to alleviate potential discomfort of the respondents. The 
introductory part of the questionnaire was thus dedicated to socio-economic 
characteristics of the surveyed individuals, such as their marital status, size of the 
household and occupational status. 
The survey then shifted to the issue of undeclared work, but the initial phase was 
focused only on attitudes and opinions of the participants in this respect. For 
instance, the participants were asked to estimate the share of the population working 
on an undeclared basis and to give their view on the most important rationales for 
such behaviour, as well as to enumerate the economic sectors in which they believe 
this type of noncompliance occurs most often. What is more, the respondents were 
also asked to evaluate the risk of being detected by the authorities when carrying out 
undeclared work and to express their attitude towards different types of 
noncompliant behaviour.  
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The insight into the exact experience of the survey respondents with undeclared 
economic activities commenced in the third part of the survey, and this was done by 
first focusing on their involvement from the demand side. Individuals who admitted 
buying undeclared goods and services were then asked some supplementary 
questions in order to comprehend their motivations for doing so, as well as to find 
out who was the supplier, how much money they spent, etc. 
This was followed by an insight into the issue of under-declared employment in 
Croatia, which was discussed only with the individuals in waged employment. As 
before, the participants who admitted receiving one part of their wage in cash were 
asked several additional questions so as to get a deeper insight into the nature of this 
phenomenon. 
Involvement of the survey participants in the supply of undeclared goods and services 
was evaluated in the fifth section of the survey. To enable triangulation of the 
findings, questions asked in this part of the survey to a great extent reflected those 
asked when scrutinising the demand side. Thus, those who identified themselves as 
undeclared workers were also asked about the reasons for doing so, as well as who 
was the buyer, how much money they earned this way, etc. This section concluded 
with an insight into the most effective policy responses to tackle undeclared work in 
Croatia from the standpoints of the survey participants as policy-takers.  
The focus then moved to the practice of pulling strings in various social and business 
spheres. The strategy applied in this part of the survey was quite similar to those in 
previous parts, as respondents who admitted involvement in this particular 
misbehaviour were then asked several supplementary questions so as to grasp the 
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most important aspects of the practice. Explicitly, the participants were asked about 
their rationales for doing so, as well as who were their accomplices and what 
compensation accompanied the transaction. Akin to the case of undeclared work, both 
the demand and supply side of the pulling string practices in Croatia were evaluated. 
The interviews finished with a range of questions on the somewhat sensitive 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the surveyed individuals, but 
which are important for understanding taxpayers’ behaviour. Namely, this final 
section of the survey was concerned with the exact age of the participants, their 
income from formal work, income from undeclared work, self-assessed financial 
situation and a few other important issues (as discussed below). 
The fieldwork, which was conducted between August and October 2015, encompassed 
2,000 individuals. A two-way stratified random sampling procedure was applied to find 
respondents, with the stratification based on regions and settlement size. Regional 
classification was grounded on six traditional regions in Croatia (North Croatia; 
Slavonia; Zagreb and surroundings; Lika and Banovina; Istria, Primorje and Gorski Kotar; 
and Dalmatia), while categories of settlement sizes were defined as: (1) less than 2,000 
inhabitants; (2) 2,000 – 10,000 inhabitants; (3) 10,001 – 100,000 inhabitants; and (4) 
more than 100,000 inhabitants. This resulted in 22 strata, given that two regions did not 
have a settlement with population above 100,000.  
In the first step, a group of settlements was selected within each stratum, whereas the 
probability assigned to each settlement was proportional to its relative size 
(measured by population). In total, 110 settlements were chosen. In the second step, a 
starting point in each settlement was selected randomly, while subsequent addresses 
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were identified using ‘random walk’ procedure (explicitly, every 6th household 
going right was chosen). The third step assumed selection of one respondent within 
each household, and this was done using the ‘closest birthday’ procedure among 
household members aged 15 years or more.  
To adjust the chosen sample with the real situation inside the population, each 
respondent was later assigned their sampling weight whose calculation was based on 
gender, age, education level, region and settlement size. It is important to stress that all 
results presented in the following chapters were obtained using sampling weights. In 
line with this, one must be aware that the numbers given in the rest of this report do 
not actually represent the ‘percentage of survey respondents’, but rather the 
‘projected percentage of population’. Still, both these phrases will be used 
interchangeably here as in most analyses discussed through the report there are only 
negligible difference between the two scenarios (i.e. with and without weights applied). 
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2 Illegitimate economic practices from the perspective of Croatian 
citizens 
To fully grasp the complex nature of illicit economic practices, it is first essential to 
understand the wider social context in which such behaviour occurs. For that reason, 
we start by examining the attitudes and perceptions of Croatian citizens with regard 
to hidden practices. This, as will become apparent, relates to one of the most 
important motivations to disobey legislation in Croatia, as well as to the social and 
economic groups commonly engaged in such activities. Both these issues will be 
discussed in the first section of this chapter.  
The second section dissects attitudes of Croatians regarding the efficiency of the 
enforcement apparatus in this South-East European country. This is followed by an 
insight into the level of tolerance towards various violating behaviours in section 2.3. 
The last part of the chapter analyses the views of Croatians on the pervasiveness of 
personal connections in the country and the importance of this strategy for 
overcoming everyday social and business difficulties. 
2.1 Views of Croatians on the nature and causes of undeclared work in the country 
As described, every interview started with general questions on socio-economic 
characteristics of the respondent (marital status, size of the household, employment 
status, etc.). Once the focus shifted to unregistered economic practices, each 
respondent was first explained what is meant by the term ‘undeclared work’. The 
interview then continued by asking some general attitudinal questions on the matter, 
with the first of them being structured as follows: 
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According to the results on this particular question, summarised in Figure 2, 
undeclared work is perceived as a highly common occurrence in Croatia. Almost one 
half of citizens think that between 20% and 50% of the active population is engaged 
in some activities that are legal per se, but remain concealed from the authorities. 
Every tenth individual went even further by stating that the majority of population do 
not report all their activities to the authorities. In addition, one in five citizens 
expressed confidence that this share ranges between 10% and 20%, thus also 
describing this practice as being fairly prevalent in society. 
Figure 2 Estimated share of citizens working on an undeclared basis in Croatia, % of 
surveyed individuals 
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without declaring their income or part of their income to the tax or social 
security institutions? 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
On the other hand, only 4.4% of the survey participants perceived this phenomenon 
as not being particularly significant problem in Croatia, as according to their belief 
less than 5% of population engages in tax evasion practices. Finally, a further 10.5% 
were certain that undeclared practices are moderately prevalent, thus estimating that 
only 5-10% of population disobeys labour and tax legislation.  
The presented findings therefore suggest that undeclared work is mostly perceived as a 
highly widespread phenomenon in Croatian society, denoting a lack of horizontal trust 
in Croatia. This notion can be further exemplified by the results of the second question 
on this matter, which was asked: 
 
The results show that that every second Croatian citizen knows at least one person 
working on an undeclared basis (see Figure 3). One can therefore see that many 
Croatians are familiar with this practice, at least indirectly from the experience of their 
friends, relatives, colleagues or acquaintances. Yet, 46.5% of the participants 
answered negatively to this question, while 4% either refused to answer or did not 
know the exact answer.  
Do you personally know any people who work without declaring their income 
or part of their income to the tax or social security institutions? 
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Figure 3 Share of Croatians knowing somebody who works on an undeclared basis, % 
of surveyed individuals 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Whether these perceptions of citizens regarding participation really match the 
situation in practice will be evaluated in the subsequent chapters. Before that, 
however, it is important to scrutinise what Croatians think about other important 
aspects of illegitimate practices. We start with their views on the occupational 
structure of undeclared workers, which were provided by the following question: 
 
Every respondent was asked to choose two groups from the following list of 
occupations: unemployed; self-employed; pensioners; full-time employees; part-time 
employees; students; and illegal immigrants. Yet, the possible answers were not limited 
Yes, 49.5%
No, 46.5%
Refusal, 1.2%
Do not know, 2.8%
Which TWO of the following groups are in your opinion most likely to carry out 
undeclared work in Croatia? 
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to the given list of economic statuses, as participants were free to identify some other 
groups of individuals in this respect.  
In the opinion of Croatian citizens, undeclared economic activities are by far most 
common among people who are officially unemployed (see Figure 4). To be more 
exact, 71.1% of the participants were certain that registered unemployed individuals 
are most likely to carry out undeclared work in Croatia, while 13.5% identified them as 
the second most frequent group to conduct undeclared work. This gives a total of 
84.6% of the survey respondents viewing unemployment as one of the key factors 
behind undeclared practices in Croatia. 
Turning to other employment statuses, the results summarised in Figure 4 reveal that 
retired individuals are also widely recognised as a group of citizens highly prone to 
undeclared work. Approximately 30% of Croatians believe that this particular group of 
individuals is most likely to work on an undeclared basis compared with other 
employment statuses. 
Figure 4 Most frequent occupational groups inside the undeclared realm in the view 
of Croatian citizens, % of surveyed individuals 
      
30 | P a g e  
 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Part-time employees are also considered to be an important cohort of the undeclared 
workforce. In total, 22.2% of the survey participants argued that part-time employees 
are among the two most frequent employment status groups to conduct undeclared 
work. They are followed by self-employed individuals, which are identified as one of 
the two most frequent occupational groups inside the undeclared realm by every fifth 
participant. On the other hand, Croatians generally think that undeclared work is not 
particularly common among full-time employees and illegal immigrants, at least when 
compared to the other groups mentioned. 
However, these are just perceptions, which do not necessarily match the situation in 
lived practice. The same note of caution applies to their views on the most important 
causes of undeclared work in Croatia, which were also scrutinised in this introductory 
part of the survey. This particular issue was approached in a similar manner as the 
previous one, with the exact question being structured as: 
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Again, a list of possible rationales was offered, although the answers were not limited 
solely to this list since the respondents were allowed to give their own additional 
reasons. As can be seen from the results, which are presented in Figure 5, there is a 
great level of consensus among Croatians regarding the key rationales for people 
participating in the undeclared realm. The participants identified insufficient income 
from a regular job and the lack of regular jobs as the two most frequent drivers of 
undeclared work in Croatia. In particular, the need to supplement low earnings from 
the official economy was recognised as one of the two most salient rationales by 
56.4% of the respondents, while 46.5% of them argued the same for the lack of 
regular jobs. This outcome is not surprising having in mind the views on the most 
frequent employment statuses. 
All other possible rationales received much lower level of recognition as potentially 
prominent motivations for Croatians engaging in undeclared work. For instance, a high 
tax burden was the third most frequently mentioned rationale, but with less than 20% of 
the survey participants identifying this particular issue as being among the top two 
problems in this respect.  
However, it is important to stress here that a non-negligible part of the population sees 
defiance towards the state as an essential rationale for undeclared work in Croatia. As 
Figure 5 displays, almost every fifth citizen believes that it is not worth paying taxes 
What are in your opinion the TWO most important reasons for engaging in 
undeclared work in Croatia? 
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since the state does not do anything in return. Finally, a substantial proportion of 
respondents identified weak enforcement mechanisms as one of the most salient 
drivers of noncompliant behaviour; 17.1% of the participants argued that insufficient 
controls encourage people to engage in undeclared work, while 8.7% were certain that 
the pervasiveness of undeclared work in Croatia can be explained by weak sanctions. 
Figure 5 Most frequent reasons to participate in undeclared work from the standpoint 
of Croatian taxpayers, % of surveyed individuals 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
To further evaluate this matter, the following section gives a more detailed insight 
into the effectiveness of the deterrence measures in Croatia. The discussion is based 
on the findings from two questions. The first one was related to the perceived 
detection risk, while the second sought to assess what sanctions Croatians expect to 
receive if caught when carrying out undeclared work.  
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2.2 The role of deterrence   
To appraise the significance that economic actors in Croatia attach to the cost side of 
undeclared work, every participant in the survey was asked the following question: 
 
Four reference points were provided and respondents had to approximate their 
perception with the closest option. The offered answers were: very small; fairly small; 
fairly high; and very high. As Figure 6 reveals, Croatians do not see the fear of being 
detected by the authorities as particularly worrying. More than one third of 
participants were certain that the risk is fairly small, while 28% went even further 
stating it is very small. This suggests that there is a significant room for improvement 
on the part of the authorities in this respect. 
Figure 6 Perceived detection risk in Croatia, % of surveyed individuals 
People who work without declaring the income risk that tax or social security 
institutions find out and issue supplementary tax bills and perhaps fines. How 
would you describe the risk of being detected in Croatia? 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Indeed, the detection risk was regarded as being very high by less than 10% of 
participants. It should also be mentioned that a share were unable to assess the exact 
risk, which resulted in the answer ‘do not know’ being chosen in 5.2% of the cases. 
To evaluate the second aspect of the deterrence, namely their perceptions of the 
penalties, every participant was given a concrete scenario and asked what penalty 
they would expect if detected by the authorities in that case: 
 
Three possible sanctions representing different levels of harshness were given: normal 
tax or social security contributions due, but no fine; normal tax or social security 
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contributions due, plus a fine; and prison. Each respondent was also allowed to 
suggest other options.  
Figure 7 Expected sanctions when detected in undeclared work in Croatia, % of 
surveyed individuals 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
As Figure 7 reveals, even though a substantial proportion of Croatians do not believe 
that any additional sanction will be imposed beyond the normal tax or social 
contributions due (38.6%), four out of ten believed that there would also be fine 
imposed as well as the taxes and social contributions due. However, only 3.3% of 
Croatians expect to be imprisoned if found to be engaged in such undeclared work. 
As with the risk of detection, a share were not certain about the exact repercussions 
(7.2%), which suggesting that many Croatians are actually not familiar with the 
legislation in this respect. Beyond deterrence, there is also the issue of tax morale, 
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which is another feature playing important role in whether to engage in undeclared 
work.   
2.3 Attitudes towards undeclared economic activities in Croatia 
To understand whether citizens view undeclared work as acceptable behaviour, citizens 
were asked size questions about the acceptability of different types of undeclared work: 
1) Someone receives welfare payments without entitlement5. 
2) A private person is hired by a private household for work and he/she does not 
report the payment received in return to tax or social security institutions although it 
should be reported. 
3) A firm is hired by a private household for work and it does not report the payment 
received in return to tax or social security institutions. 
4) A firm is hired by another firm for work and it does not report its activity to tax or 
social security institutions. 
5) A firm hires a private person and all or a part of the salary paid to him/her is not 
officially registered.  
6) Someone evades taxes by not or only partially declaring income. 
The respondents were then asked to express their level of tolerance towards each of 
these six situations on a 10-point Likert-type scale, where higher values indicate 
greater tolerance. The exact question was structured as follows: 
                                                          
5 This refers to a situation in which an individual deliberately choses to work on an undeclared basis 
simply to keep receiving welfare payments, as he or she would lose these benefit otherwise.  
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Figure 8 presents the results. The most apparent finding is that Croatian citizens 
tolerate undeclared work by a private person for a private household to a much 
greater extent than the remaining five types of noncompliance. Only every second 
citizen disapproves of this particular form of undeclared work, which is a substantially 
lower share than is the case for all other forms of undeclared work considered. At the 
same time, 15.2% of Croatians were highly tolerant of undeclared work conducted by 
a private person for a private household, which clearly confirms that this type of 
misbehaviour is by far the most tolerated form of undeclared work in Croatia. 
  
Figure 8 Toleration of various types of noncompliance, % of surveyed individuals 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
A scenario in which a private person partially or completely conceals their income 
from the authorities appears to be moderately or highly approved by one quarter of 
the population, therefore placing this particular type of noncompliance in second 
place. Yet there is an evident difference between the two. For instance, only 4.3% of 
Croatians highly tolerate evasion of personal income taxes and social contributions by 
self-employed individuals, which is a much lower share than in the case of individuals 
working for a private household on an undeclared basis (15.2%). 
Although one might assume based on these findings that undeclared work by private 
persons is more tolerated in Croatia than undeclared work by firms, this is not the 
case. Namely, the results summarised in Figure 8 also reveal that Croatians are least 
tolerant towards receiving welfare payments without entitlement. For instance, almost 
nine out of ten participants highly disapproved situations in which an individual 
chooses undeclared work simply to preserve the right to receive financial support 
from the public budget.  
On the other hand, it seems that Croatians do not particularly differentiate between 
various types of tax evasion by companies. The results indicate that undeclared work 
by a firm for another firm is somewhat less tolerated than situations in which private 
persons are one party in the transaction. To verify this, Figure 9 presents the findings 
in a slightly different form, giving an average level of support for each of the six forms 
of undeclared work.  
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Figure 9 Toleration of various types of noncompliance: a comparison of average 
scores 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Indeed, this alternative view better displays the differences between the acceptability 
of the six types of undeclared work. Undeclared work by a private person for a private 
household enjoys much higher average approval than the other five forms of 
noncompliant behaviour. This particular type of disobedience received an average 
tolerance of 3.82 out of 10. It is followed by partial or complete concealment of income 
by private persons, with the average amounting to 2.55.  
On the other hand, individuals receiving welfare benefits without entitlement received 
the lowest average support (1.70), while there is no substantial difference in tolerance 
of the three situations related to undeclared work by firms. Yet, undeclared work by 
firms for another firm seems slightly less supported, with an average tolerance of 
1.94. 
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To assess the extent to which Croatians indeed differentiate between these six types 
of misbehaviour, Table 1 gives the matrix of bivariate correlations for each pair. This 
reveals that Croatians indeed apply different criteria towards receiving welfare 
payments without entitlement compared with the remaining five violating behaviours. 
The accompanying correlation coefficients range from 0.25 to 0.43 (see column 2 in 
Table 1), thus indicating that even though attitudes towards the dishonest claiming of 
social benefits are positively associated with attitudes towards other misbehaviours 
(i.e. those who tend to tolerate other illegitimate practices will also tend to tolerate 
this particular one and vice versa), these associations are quite weak.  
Table 1 Attitudes towards six types of undeclared work, correlation matrix 
  
Receiving 
welfare 
payments 
without 
entitlement 
Undeclared 
work by a 
private 
person for 
a private 
household 
Undeclared 
work by a 
firm for a 
private 
household 
Undeclared 
work by a 
firm for 
another 
firm 
Undeclared 
work by a 
private 
person for 
a firm 
Individual 
evades 
taxes by 
not or only 
partially 
declaring 
income 
Receiving welfare 
payments without 
entitlement 
1.00 0.25 0.43 0.42 0.37 0.37 
Undeclared work by a 
private person for a 
private household 
0.25 1.00 0.42 0.31 0.38 0.52 
Undeclared work by a firm 
for a private household 
0.43 0.42 1.00 0.77 0.66 0.55 
Undeclared work by a firm 
for another firm 
0.42 0.31 0.77 1.00 0.71 0.57 
Undeclared work by a 
private person for a firm 
0.37 0.38 0.66 0.71 1.00 0.62 
Individual evades taxes by 
not or only partially 
declaring income 
0.37 0.52 0.55 0.57 0.62 1.00 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
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A similar conclusion can be drawn in the case of tolerance towards undeclared work 
by an individual for a private household. The associated correlation coefficients range 
from 0.25 to 0.52 (see column 3 in Table 1), which suggests that attitudes towards 
undeclared work by an individual for a household also seem to be quite independent 
from their attitudes towards the remaining five violating behaviours. On the other 
hand, the magnitude of correlations among the four remaining types of undeclared 
work indicate that Croatians presumably do not significantly distinguish between 
them. For instance, the bivariate correlation coefficients for these four variables range 
from 0.55 to 0.71, which designates quite a high level of interdependency among 
them.  
To further assess this, Table 2 shows how each individual variable contributes to the 
joint measures of interdependency. The second column of the table for instance gives 
the correlation between a variable and the sum of the remaining five variables. The 
findings endorse the earlier notion that Croatians apply different criteria when 
assessing undeclared work by a private person for a private household compared with 
other types of undeclared work, and the same applies to receiving welfare payments 
without entitlement. This is also evident when changes in the average inter-item 
correlation after excluding an individual variable are scrutinised (column 3). Exclusion of 
the first two variables would increase the average inter-item correlation, while the 
opposite holds true for the remaining four variables. 
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Table 2 Inter-item correlations and Cronbach’s alpha 
  
Item-rest 
correlatio
n 
Average inter-
item correlation 
when the variable 
is excluded 
Cronbach’s 
alpha when 
variable is 
excluded 
Receiving welfare payments without entitlement 0.45 0.55 0.86 
Undeclared work by a private person for a private 
household 
0.47 0.55 0.86 
Undeclared work by a firm for a private household 0.76 0.45 0.80 
Undeclared work by a firm for another firm 0.74 0.46 0.81 
Undeclared work by a private person for a firm 0.73 0.46 0.81 
Individual evades taxes by not or only partially declaring 
income 
0.69 0.47 0.82 
Test scale 
 
0.49 0.85 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
The same conclusion is reached when examining the values of Cronbach’s alpha, 
which are given in the last column of Table 26. Cronbach’s alpha accounts for 0.85 
when all six variables are included (see the last row of the table). Yet, omitting the first 
two variables increases this value, while it drops if any of the remaining four is 
excluded. 
To draw conclusions, the exploratory factor analysis was applied in the last step7. The 
analysis indeed confirmed that there is more than one latent construct driving 
attitudes of Croatian citizens towards the six types of noncompliance. As expected, 
answers on the last four questions were influenced by one single factor, while 
                                                          
6 Ranging between 0 and 1, this indicator measures internal consistency of variables. Higher values of 
Cronbach’s alpha indicate higher consistency within the sample. For detailed explanation of 
Cronbach’s alpha and its exact formula see Tavakol and Dennick (2011). 
7 The goal of the exploratory factor analysis is to see whether individual’s performance on a set of 
observed indicators can be explained by a smaller number of latent mechanisms. Commonly known as 
‘factors’, these mechanisms are not directly measurable, but are instead hidden constructs with the 
observed variables being their manifestations in overt behaviour. For more details on the exploratory factor 
analysis see for instance Raykov and Marcoulides (2008). 
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different reasoning mechanisms lie behind attitudes towards the first two violating 
behaviours8. Yet, it should be stressed that the obtained factors were not completely 
independent from each other. Reflecting high interest in understanding the psycho-
sociological roots of undeclared work in Croatia, the extracted values of the most 
dominant factor (i.e. the one shaping attitudes towards the last four types of 
disobedience) will be used as a tax morale index in further analyses.  
After dissecting perceptions of Croatians about various types of noncompliance, we 
move to the issue of pulling strings. It is, however, important to say that this here 
reports only results on opinions of the participants in this respect, while their lived 
practices will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
2.4 Views of Croatian citizens on importance of personal connections in everyday life 
To analyse to what extent citizens support the use of personal connections to get 
things done, as well as to get some insight into the societal dimension of this practice, 
the following question was posed: 
 
The respondents were asked to express their views on a four-level scale: not 
important; somewhat important; important; and very important. Figure 10 reveals that 
                                                          
8 The exact details of the applied procedure are beyond the scope of this report, and thus will not be 
discussed here. Explanations and data can be obtained by request from the authors.  
In your opinion, how important are connections to achieve certain goals in 
Croatia? 
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86.4% of the participants perceived this practice as important or very important for 
achieving certain goals. In other words, most Croatians think that reliance on personal 
connections is necessary if one wants to sort out various problems, which indicates 
that this illegitimate practice is highly ingrained in Croatian society. 
Figure 10 Views of Croatians on importance of connections to achieve certain goals in 
Croatia, % of surveyed individuals 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
On the other hand, less than 2% of the respondents were certain that everyday 
problems and tasks can be easily handled without assistance from friends, relatives 
and acquaintances. Although suggesting the pervasiveness of pulling strings to get 
things done, these results do not display the attitudes towards this practice. To find 
this out, the following question was posed:   
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The following options were offered to choose from: very negative; negative; neutral; 
positive; and very positive. As Figure 11 displays only slightly above one half of 
population has a negative attitude towards this misbehaviour; 58% highly oppose the 
practice of seeking for help or favours from people within one’s social circles so as to 
achieve advantage in various spheres of life. On the other hand, one in ten citizens see 
this as a rather positive phenomenon, while a further 1.3% have a very positive opinion 
about using this to resolve problems and skip obstacles. Some three out of ten are 
neutral. 
Figure 11 Attitudes towards having things done by pulling strings, % of surveyed 
individuals 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
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Based on these results, one can see that a substantial segment of the population has 
more or less a predisposition to participate in this type of dishonest behaviour. To 
what extent pulling strings really happens in practice will be discussed latter. Before 
that, we will first focus on citizens’ engagement in various types of undeclared work. 
This will be done in three steps: the discussion starts with the overview of the demand 
side of undeclared work, which is given in the next chapter. Chapter 4 then presents 
the most important findings on envelope wage practices, while the supply side of 
undeclared work in Croatia is evaluated in Chapter 5. After discussing these three 
aspects of undeclared work, we move to pulling string practices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Undeclared work by a private 
person for a household is by far 
the most tolerated way of 
disobedience with labour and tax 
legislation in Croatia. 
 
 Citizens highly oppose receiving 
welfare payments without 
entitlement. 
 
 Croatians mostly believe that for 
achieving certain goals one must 
rely on personal connections. 
 
 One in nine citizens have a positive 
Perceptions of taxpayers in Croatia – key facts 
 
 Croatians generally think that 
undeclared work is a highly 
prevalent practice in society. 
 
 Unemployment identified as 
the key factor behind 
undeclared activities in 
Croatia. 
 
 Enforcement mechanisms 
widelly recognised as being 
quite weak. 
 
 Two-thirds of Croatians think 
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3 An insight into the demand side of undeclared work in Croatia 
Examining their personal involvement in the purchase of undeclared goods and 
services, the first section of this chapter provides a descriptive overview of the 
demographic, socio-economic and geographical characteristics of those buying 
undeclared goods and services. The issue is then evaluated in more depth in section 
3.2 by applying logit modelling9. Since this particular type of statistical analysis 
scrutinises all available explanatory factors in parallel, it represents an essential tool in 
determining which individual characteristics indeed exert influence on the demand for 
undeclared goods and services, and which do not. The discussion is then continued in 
section 3.3, which summarises the most important findings on the exact goods and 
services bought, people who provided these goods and services, as well as on the 
reasons for relying on informal means of payment. 
3.1 Purchasers of undeclared goods and services – a descriptive overview 
The inquiry about the demand for undeclared goods and services in Croatia started 
with the following two questions: 
                                                          
9 Binary logit models are used to evaluate how well an individual's response to a binary outcome variable 
can be predicted by responses on the set of explanatory variables (Cramer, 2003; Hosmer, Lemeshow, & 
Sturdivant, 2013) 
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In total, 15.9% of the surveyed individuals admitted buying goods on an undeclared 
basis during the last 12 months, while 20% stated they had acquired one or more 
services on an undeclared basis. Table 3 reports the results. Since there are no 
substantial differences in demographic, socio-economic and geographic 
characteristics between the individuals who purchased goods on an undeclared basis 
and those who purchased services, findings for these two segments will be discussed 
together.  
Starting with the role of gender, men seem to be slightly more prone to acquire 
goods and services undeclared than women (see Table 3). While 16.4% of men 
admitted purchasing goods undeclared and 21.2% services, for women this amounted 
to just 15.4% and 18.9% respectively.  
When it comes to age, Table 3 shows that the oldest age cohort is much less prone to 
purchase undeclared than the rest of population. For instance, only 9.7% of people 
Q1) Have you in the last twelve months acquired any SERVICES of which you 
had a good reason to assume that they involved undeclared work, i.e. that the 
income was not completely reported to tax or social security institutions (e.g., 
because there was no invoice or VAT receipt or they offered you a ‘price for 
cash’)? 
 
Q2) And have you in the last twelve months acquired any GOODS of which you 
had a good reason to assume that they embodied undeclared work, i.e. that the 
income was no completely reported to tax or social security institutions? 
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aged 65 or more purchased undeclared goods, while this rises to 14.3% for 
individuals between 55 and 64 years of age. Although there is no substantial 
difference between the remaining groups, it is nevertheless noticeable that the 
youngest individuals (15-24 years of age) are somewhat less inclined to this practice 
than the rest of the active population. Yet, this primarily applies to the purchase of 
services as in the case of goods this discrepancy is much less pronounced.  
Croatians living on their own seem to be much less prone to turn to the undeclared 
market when seeking products and services. This is exemplified not only by the fact 
that single and widowed individuals comprise a minor segment of all undeclared 
purchasers, but also considering the link between the size of the household and 
readiness to participate in undeclared purchases. In general, the larger the number of 
people in a household seems to entail a higher propensity of an individual to rely on 
undeclared purchases. Yet, one must be careful here as the role of marital status and 
size of one’s household may actually be mere reflections of other drivers. For 
instance, since older individuals are far more likely to be widowed and to live alone, it 
is reasonable to assume that actually their age (or perhaps employment status) 
influences their propensity to participate in the undeclared market, and therefore the 
effects of marital status and the size of the household might be spurious. More about 
this issue is given later. 
  
      
50 | P a g e  
 
Table 3 Demand for undeclared goods and services in Croatia, % of surveyed 
individuals 
  Purchase of undeclared goods Purchase of undeclared services 
  Yes No Refusal DK Yes No Refusal DK 
G
e
n
d
e
r 
Male 16.4 79.7 0.6 3.3 21.2 77.4 0.5 0.9 
Female 15.4 81.3 0.7 2.6 18.9 78.9 0.8 1.4 
A
g
e
 
15 - 24 16.0 78.8 1.1 4.1 15.4 81.0 0.8 2.8 
25 - 34 19.6 77.7 0.5 2.2 23.0 75.3 0.6 1.1 
35 - 44 19.1 77.1 1.2 2.6 24.8 73.9 0.6 0.7 
45 - 54 18.1 78.0 0.5 3.4 22.8 75.1 0.6 1.5 
55 - 64 14.3 82.2 0.5 3.0 19.5 78.6 1.1 0.8 
65+ 9.7 87.4 0.3 2.6 15.0 84.3 0.3 0.4 
M
a
rt
ia
l 
st
a
tu
s (Re)Married 16.3 81.2 0.4 2.1 21.4 77.2 0.3 1.1 
Cohabiting 22.6 73.6 2.8 1.0 23.2 73.8 2.4 0.6 
Single 15.6 78.9 0.5 5.0 15.6 81.9 0.5 2.0 
Divorced 18.2 75.7 0.0 6.1 23.4 73.5 1.2 1.9 
Widowed 7.2 88.4 0.9 3.5 16.0 82.4 1.3 0.3 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 
si
ze
 
One  11.6 83.8 0.2 4.4 15.7 82.8 0.7 0.8 
Two 15.7 81.6 0.8 1.9 19.4 78.8 1.0 0.8 
Three 18.7 77.1 0.7 3.5 23.4 74.6 0.5 1.5 
Four or more 17.1 79.6 0.7 2.6 20.9 77.0 0.3 1.8 
O
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
 
Dependent employee 18.0 79.1 0.5 2.4 24.1 74.3 0.5 1.1 
Self-employed 27.4 65.0 2.7 4.9 22.9 74.4 2.7 0.0 
Unemployed 18.2 78.5 0.5 2.8 19.6 78.4 0.4 1.6 
Retired 10.6 86.5 0.4 2.5 16.4 82.5 0.7 0.4 
Inactive (students. disabled. 
etc.) 
16.4 76.6 1.6 5.4 15.1 80.9 0.7 3.3 
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
si
tu
a
ti
o
n
 Struggling 15.8 80.5 0.5 3.2 18.7 79.7 0.7 0.9 
Maintaining 14.3 82.2 0.5 3.0 18.8 80.0 0.5 0.7 
Just comfortable 19.2 77.7 0.9 2.2 24.5 72.2 0.7 2.6 
No money problems 12.3 77.6 4.2 5.9 19.0 76.8 4.2 0.0 
N
e
t 
in
co
m
e
 f
ro
m
 f
o
rm
a
l 
w
o
rk
 
0 16.4 80.2 0.7 2.7 16.7 80.9 0.5 1.9 
1-2,500 14.2 83.2 0.5 2.1 16.4 82.0 0.7 0.9 
2,501-5,000 16.4 79.6 0.6 3.4 21.9 76.8 0.7 0.6 
5,001-7,500 19.0 79.0 0.0 2.0 26.7 73.3 0.0 0.0 
7,501-10,000 15.6 78.0 0.0 6.4 28.4 71.6 0.0 0.0 
10,001-15,000 0.0 96.0 0.0 4.0 24.0 72.0 0.0 4.0 
More than 15,000 15.2 49.6 0.0 35.2 49.5 50.5 0.0 0.0 
E
st
im
a
te
d
 s
h
a
re
 
o
f 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
 i
n
 U
W
 
Less than 5% 8.6 89.6 0.0 1.8 9.3 90.7 0.0 0.0 
5 to 10% 12.3 83.9 1.3 2.5 14.7 83.9 0.5 0.9 
10 to 20% 11.7 85.4 0.5 2.4 14.3 84.8 0.4 0.5 
20 to 50% 18.9 77.6 0.5 3.0 23.7 74.4 0.6 1.3 
50% or more 22.9 73.5 0.4 3.2 31.6 65.0 1.3 2.1 
P
e
rc
e
iv
e
d
 
d
e
te
ci
o
n
 r
is
k
 
Very small 15.3 81.2 0.8 2.7 20.0 78.4 0.5 1.1 
Fairly small 17.6 78.5 0.4 3.5 23.0 75.3 0.2 1.5 
Fairly high 13.4 83.8 0.7 2.1 16.9 81.2 0.8 1.1 
Very high 15.6 82.5 1.5 0.4 17.5 80.1 1.9 0.5 
E
xp
e
ct
e
d
 
sa
n
ct
io
n
s Tax + contributions 16.1 81.8 0.4 1.7 20.5 78.9 0.3 0.3 
Tax + contributions + fine 15.6 80.2 0.5 3.7 20.3 77.7 0.6 1.4 
Prison 4.2 92.7 0.0 3.1 10.0 90.0 0.0 0.0 
T
a
x 
m
o
ra
le
 
<2 12.4 84.9 0.3 2.4 17.1 81.8 0.4 0.7 
2-4 23.3 71.0 1.3 4.4 26.4 71.3 0.4 1.9 
4-6 19.7 74.4 2.5 3.4 23.4 71.3 3.3 2.0 
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6-8 31.1 68.9 0.0 0.0 30.6 67.8 0.0 1.6 
8-10 11.3 79.3 0.0 9.4 11.3 79.3 0.0 9.4 
T
y
p
e
 o
f 
co
m
m
u
n
. 
Rural area or village 16.7 81.1 0.7 1.5 20.3 77.8 0.8 1.1 
Small or middle sized town 18.5 78.2 1.0 2.3 23.6 74.3 0.9 1.2 
Large town 11.1 83.0 0.2 5.7 14.4 84.2 0.0 1.4 
R
e
g
io
n
 
Zagreb 11.5 82.6 0.6 5.3 15.3 82.6 0.4 1.7 
North Croatia 10.0 85.7 1.0 3.3 16.6 80.4 1.3 1.7 
Slavonia 18.8 79.4 0.8 1.0 20.1 79.3 0.6 0.0 
Lika and Banovina 17.2 81.2 0.0 1.6 18.9 80.0 0.0 1.1 
Istria. Primorje and Gorski 
Kotar 
20.4 75.6 0.5 3.5 30.1 68.2 1.0 0.7 
Dalmatia 21.1 76.9 0.6 1.4 23.2 75.0 0.4 1.4 
Total  15.9 80.5 0.7 2.9 20.0 78.2 0.6 1.2 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Turning to the employment status of informal buyers, self-employed Croatians are 
most likely to acquire goods undeclared. More than one quarter of the surveyed self-
employed admitted this, which is considerably higher than for dependent employees 
and the unemployed (18% and 18.2% respectively). Yet, for the purchase of services, 
dependent employees more frequently did so. As expected based on previous 
findings, retired individuals represent the category of population that is least prone to 
such behaviour (Williams and Horodnic, 2016a; Williams and Martinez-Perez, 2014). 
There is no apparent link between personal wealth and propensity to purchase in the 
undeclared economy. Both variables (i.e. the self-assessed financial situation and net 
income from formal employment) indicate that these are unrelated to the propensity 
to purchase undeclared. Indeed, the respondents describing their financial situation 
as ‘just comfortable’ most frequently engaged. Similarly, those with income 
around the national average (i.e. earning HRK 5,001-7,500) more often admitted 
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buying goods undeclared, while for services it was individuals earning between HRK 
7,501 and HRK 10,00010. 
Location, however, seems to influence the propensity to purchase undeclared. As 
Table 3 displays, people from large towns less frequently admitted purchasing 
undeclared goods and services than those from small towns and rural areas. In 
addition, people in Istria, Primorje and Gorski Kotar more often purchase undeclared 
goods and services, followed by citizens from Dalmatia and Slavonia. Such behaviour 
seems less prevalent in the capital.  
Perceptions about the pervasiveness of unregistered economic activities seems to 
significantly determine whether one engages in such endeavour. The larger the 
proportion of the population perceived to be engaged in undeclared work, the more 
likely they themselves are to purchase undeclared goods and services. For instance, 
while only 8.6% of individuals stating that less than one in twenty Croatian citizens 
engaged in undeclared work admitted buying undeclared goods, this rises to 22.9% 
for those who think that at least every second citizen carries out undeclared work. Yet, 
one must be cautious here as there is probably double causality. That it is to say, it is 
plausible to expect that individuals participating in the undeclared economy would 
perceive this phenomenon as being more prevalent than the rest of population, 
simply due to having close relations with other people inside this parallel realm.  
As Table 3 indicates, the role of deterrence in influencing the propensity to purchase 
appears limited. There is no apparent link between the perceived detection risk and 
purchasing undeclared goods and services. For instance, 15.6% of those believing the 
                                                          
10 HRK stands for ‘Croatian kuna’, which is the official currency in Croatia. 
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risk is very high admitted buying undeclared goods, which is slightly higher than for 
those anticipating the risk as being fairly high (13.4%) and almost identical to those 
who think the risk is negligible (15.3%). Although surprising, there is a reasonable 
explanation for this finding. The question on the perceived detection risk referred 
explicitly to the supply side (i.e. to the individuals who offer undeclared goods and 
services), and thus this variable has a limited role in explaining behaviour of 
purchasers. 
The expected sanctions, however, do influence behaviour. While those expecting to 
pay only taxes and social contributions due if caught, and those who also expect 
some sort of financial penalty, have fairly similar propensities to purchase undeclared 
(16.1% and 15.6% respectively for goods, and 20.5% and 20.3% for services), those 
expecting to be imprisoned have much lower purchasing rates (4.2% for goods and 
10% for services). Penalties, therefore, seem an important determinant of the 
propensity to purchase undeclared goods and services. 
The tax morale index, introduced in the previous chapter, and as can be seen in Table 
3, is related to the propensity to purchase undeclared. There is a higher tendency of 
individuals with lower tax morale (i.e. those with higher values of the index) to 
purchase undeclared goods and services, but with one limitation. Individuals with the 
lowest tax morale (i.e. with index values between 8 and 10) less frequently admitted 
purchasing undeclared. One explanation is that this is a small size group.  Another is 
that individuals from this group were far more likely to answer that they do not know 
whether some of the goods and services they bought were acquired undeclared. As 
such, the propensity to avoid answering might be higher among individuals 
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purchasing undeclared goods and services. It is therefore crucial to apply a rigorous 
statistical approach when analysing this issue. 
There is an additional reason to apply statistical methods before drawing conclusions, 
which was discussed in the previous chapter. It is crucial to scrutinise the 
demographic, socio-economic and geographic characteristics of those involved in 
purchasing undeclared goods and services in parallel so as to understand the role of 
each variable. In other words, the effect of each individual variable can be properly 
assessed only if controlling for other possible determinants. In the next section, 
therefore, binary logit modelling is applied to see which of the above variables remain 
significant when taking into account and controlling for other variables, and which do 
not, when discussing variables significantly associated with purchasing undeclared 
goods and services.  
3.2 Determinants of the demand for goods and services in Croatia – findings from the 
logit modelling 
To simplify assessment of the factors driving  the purchase of undeclared goods and 
services, we here do not distinguish between purchase of goods and services. As such, 
a new (dependent) variable is constructed which has a value of ‘1’ if an individual 
purchased either undeclared goods or services, and ‘0’ otherwise. This strategy of 
merging answers from two questions does not undermine the validity of the findings 
given that there is no considerable difference between demand for goods and demand 
for services in terms of socio-economic and demographic characteristics of individuals 
who acquire them (as discussed in section 3.1).  
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Regarding the explanatory variables used in the logit modelling, it is important to 
stress that not all variables discussed in the descriptive insight above were included in 
the analysis. For instance, marital status and the size of one’s household had to be 
excluded owing to the issues with multicollinearity, as both were found to be 
significantly determined by other covariates (in first line by age and occupation). In 
addition, a strong correlation between net income and the self-assessed financial 
situation was detected and therefore one of them had to be omitted. The decision 
was made to retain the latter, primarily due to smaller number of categories, 
therefore reducing the number of coefficients to estimate. 
Moreover, age and the tax morale index were applied in a significantly different form 
than it was the case in the descriptive insight above. Since these are both essentially 
given as interval variables (not as categorical as presented earlier), the original values 
were used in the logit modelling. This was done not only to increase the ratio of 
sample size to the number of regression coefficients to estimate, but also to reduce 
the risk of potential bias arising from existing multicollinearity. Additionally, there was 
a need to address an issue with a substantial number of missing values for the tax 
morale index, and therefore using the exact values of the index was a much better 
option.   
In this regard, it must be stated that the problem with faulty answers (Refusal/DK) was 
addressed by applying multiple imputation technique (Little & Rubin, 2002; Newman, 
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2014; van Buuren, 2007). In short, 25 values were simulated for each missing answer 
and the results were later incorporated following the Rubin’s rule (Rubin, 1987)11.  
The results of the conducted logit modelling are presented in Table 4. These mostly 
confirm the descriptive statistics. The only somewhat surprising finding is that gender is 
not a statistically significant determinant of one’s inclination towards cash-in-hand 
purchase of goods in services. As can be seen from the presented results (Table 4), 
women are indeed less likely to rely on informal means of payment than men, but this 
difference is found to be insignificant.  
The analysis further revealed that age also exerts no effect on one’s propensity to 
purchase goods and services from the undeclared market. Although it might be 
surprising at first glance, there is a plausible explanation for this outcome. Namely, 
the descriptive insight indicates that the oldest age cohorts are undoubtedly less 
likely to participate in this type of illegitimate transaction, while the differences were 
inconclusive for other groups. The applied logit model indeed confirmed this, but 
through the employment status. As illustrated, retired individuals are significantly less 
likely to buy undeclared goods and services than the rest of population, therefore 
indicating that it is not their age but rather employment status which determines the 
behaviour of older citizens. Yet, no significant difference in behaviour between other 
employment status groups was found.  
The findings on regional differences in demand for goods and services are also in 
contrast with what was expected based on the descriptive overview. Even though 
people living in Istria, Primorje and Gorski Kotar were indeed found to be significantly 
                                                          
11 For more details on the multiple imputation technique see Little and Rubin (2002).  
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more prone to participate in such illegitimate transactions than their counterparts 
elsewhere in Croatia, the logit modelling revealed that there is no significant 
difference between other parts of the country in this respect. This indicates that there 
are some other peculiarities that distinguish individuals from different parts of the 
country and which at the same time explain the dissimilarities in the demand for 
undeclared goods and services between regions. In other words, it seems that the 
region in which one lives is only an intermediary variable in this respect, not the 
explanatory factor per se. 
The results for the remaining variables confirm expectations based on the descriptive 
insight. Starting with the size of the community, the analysis shows that people living 
in larger towns are far less likely to acquire goods and services on an undeclared basis 
than those living in smaller communities. On the other hand, there is no difference 
between individuals from small towns and individuals from rural areas in this respect. 
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Table 4 Determinants of demand for goods and services in Croatia, results of the logit 
model 
  
i  Standard error 
    
Female -0.020 0.116 
   
Age 0.005 0.004 
   
Occupation (RC: Unemployed)   
Dependent employee 0.199 0.173 
Self-employed 0.441 0.319 
Retired   -0.490* 0.216 
Inactive (students, disabled, etc.) -0.142 0.239 
   
Financial situation (RC: Struggling)   
 Maintaining 0.005 0.139 
Just comfortable 0.252 0.159 
No money problems 0.240 0.521 
   
Estimated share of population engaged in UW (RC: 
More than 50%) 
  
Less than 5% -1.580*** 0.380 
5 to 10% -1.054*** 0.248 
10 to 20% -0.878*** 0.203 
20 to 50%                  -0.257 0.166 
   
Perceived detection risk (RC: Very small)   
Fairly small   0.098 0.145 
Fairly high -0.224                        0.171 
Very high -0.181 0.211 
    
Expected sanctions (RC: Tax + social security 
contributions due) 
  
Tax + contributions + fine                       -0.167                       0.128 
Prison -1.044* 0.406 
    
Tax morale     0.163*** 0.034 
   
Type of community (RC: Rural area or village)   
Small or middle sized town 0.022                        0.131 
Large town     -0.593*** 0.167 
    
Region (RC: Zagreb and surroundings)   
North Croatia -0.329 0.204 
Slavonia -0.092 0.194 
Lika and Banovina -0.033 0.248 
Istria, Primorje and Gorski Kotar    0.409* 0.197 
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Dalmatia  0.068 0.179 
    
Const   -0.884** 0.349 
   
Number of observations 2,000 
Number of imputations 25 
Prob > F 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.075 
Area under ROC 0.683 
Significance: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia  
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Furthermore, the logit analysis revealed that financial situation has no significant 
effect on purchasing undeclared, while the opposite holds true in the case of the 
perceived level of participation in undeclared practices. The greater is the  perceived 
prevalence of undeclared work, the greater is the propensity to purchase undeclared. 
Still, it must be reiterated once again that there is probably a two-way causality here, 
as those having a direct contact with undeclared work presumably anticipate the 
phenomenon as being far more prevalent than those who are outside this realm. 
Turning to the deterrence effect of policies, the findings endorse the earlier notion 
that deterrence has quite a limited effect on whether individuals purchase undeclared 
goods and services. This outcome is not surprising given that the question on the 
perceived risk was related solely to the supply side of the undeclared economy. Yet, 
the perceived penalty in the case of being caught is found to be important, at least to 
the extent that individuals expecting to be imprisoned when detected are significantly 
less likely to purchase undeclared goods and services than the rest of population. 
Finally, the findings reveal that tax morale is indeed highly important. The higher the 
level of toleration of illegitimate economic practices, the higher is the propensity to 
purchase undeclared goods and services. 
Which goods and services Croatians most frequently buy from the informal market is 
discussed in the following section, followed by who are the most common suppliers 
of these goods and services, as well as what factors underlay decisions of the citizens 
to purchase goods and services from the informal market. 
      
61 | P a g e  
 
3.3 Some additional aspects of undeclared work in Croatia from demand side 
To expand our understanding of the complex mechanisms behind undeclared work in 
Croatia from the demand side, every individual that admitted purchase of goods 
and/or services was asked several supplementary questions on this matter. This 
section gives a descriptive elaboration of these issues. 
We start with the exact goods and services that the surveyed individuals acquired on 
the undeclared basis during 12 months preceding the survey. This particular question 
was structured as follows: 
 
A list f goods and services was offered to assist respondents in answering the 
question, but each individual was allowed to add a good and/or service that was not 
on the list. Moreover, multiple answers were possible.  
As Figure 12 reveals, food is most often bought by Croatian citizens on an undeclared 
basis. Approximately one third of the surveyed individuals stated that they had been 
buying some sort of agricultural products (milk, meat, crops, fruits, etc.) by informal 
means of payment, which straightforwardly highlights agriculture as the sector with a 
high incidence of undeclared work. This is followed by various household rep[airs and 
renovations, which was mentioned by 29.1% of the respondents. This therefore 
Which of the following goods or services have you paid for during the last 12 
months, where you had good reason to believe that they involved undeclared 
work (i.e. the income was not completely reported to the tax authorities)? 
      
62 | P a g e  
 
suggests that the domestic construction sector is also a potential source of 
illegitimate labour practices in Croatia. 
Figure 12 Goods and services acquired on an informal basis, % of respondents 
admitting participation from the demand side 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
A substantial share of the respondents identified car repairs as another service which 
they commonly acquire on the informal market, thus placing this activity high on the 
list when it comes to the prevalence of undeclared work. Some 27.6% of the surveyed 
purchasers of undeclared goods and services did not ask for a receipt after having 
their car repaired. This share is much higher than in the case of hairdressers and/or 
beauty treatments, which was acknowledged by 22.3% of the participants as a service 
paid on an undeclared basis. 
Yet, other offered goods and services seem not to be particularly related to 
undeclared work in Croatia. For instance, babysitting was mentioned in less than 2% 
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of cases, and the same applies to elderly care. This, however, confirms findings on the 
nature and causes of undeclared work in Croatia from other studies, which suggested 
that Croatians mostly rely on unpaid help of family members and relatives when in 
need of these two types of activities (Franic & Williams, 2014; Rubić, 2013). 
The situation is only slightly different when it comes to other activities conducted in 
or around one’s home. For instance, 5% of individuals admitted paying under-the-
table for assistance in their garden, while less than 7% did so for domestic services. 
Again, self-provisioning and unpaid help are plausible explanations for such a small 
share of people relying on the undeclared market for these services.  
Among other informal transactions mentioned by the respondents (i.e. which were 
not on the offered list of activities) the most important are payment of services in the 
catering industry (pubs, restaurants, coffee bars), purchase and chopping of wood, 
purchase of tobacco and repairs of various electronic devices (TVs, mobile phones, 
washing machines, etc.). 
Besides the exact goods and services acquired on the informal market, it was also 
important to grasp the socio-economic dimension of the mechanisms supporting 
undeclared work in Croatia. For that reason, every survey respondent who identified 
themselves as a purchaser of undeclared goods and/or services was instructed to focus 
on the most important such good/service obtained during the 12-month period 
preceding the survey so as to answer this question:  
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Similar to the previous questions, respondents were given a list of potential suppliers, 
but the option ‘other’ was also specified in case their answer does not match any 
of the offered categories. Figure 13 reveals that social ties play an essential role in 
unregistered economic transactions in Croatia. Namely, almost two out of five 
undeclared transitions in Croatia assume a close social link between the two parties 
involved (i.e. friends, colleagues or acquaintances). This outcome is somewhat 
understandable given that purchase of goods and services from individuals they know 
reduces the risk for the buyer in case the quality of a product or service is not 
satisfactory. 
However, not all social categories seem to play an important role in this respect. As 
can be seen from Figure 13, neighbours are mentioned as providers only by 8% of the 
surveyed individuals, while 3% identified relatives as the people who they bought the 
good/service from. Unfortunately, it is not possible to say whether this is due to the 
fact that these two groups of people are rarely compensated for their contribution 
(i.e. their involvement is most often characterised as help) or whether there is some 
other explanation for this peculiarity. In any case, one must be careful here as this 
particular question referred only to the most significant good or service, which 
therefore gives a partial picture about the state of affairs.  
Among the following, could you please indicate from whom did you buy this 
good or service? 
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Figure 13 The structure of the suppliers of undeclared goods and services in 
Croatia, % of respondents admitting participation from the demand side 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Leaving this issue aside, Figure 13 further reveals that the second most important 
category of suppliers are private persons and households without a firm social link 
with the purchasers (accounting for 38% of unregistered transactions). On the other 
hand, only 7% of the respondents acknowledged the purchase of goods/services 
from firms or businesses. This is somewhat expected having in mind the earlier 
findings on the exact goods and services that are most frequently acquired on an 
undeclared basis in Croatia.  
However, this does not mean that the role of the companies is negligible. It should be 
reiterated that the survey focused only on private persons and their experience with 
unregistered economic activities. Since the bulk of undeclared activities assumes firm-
to-firm transactions, one must bear in mind that the presented household survey was 
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able to grasp only one slice of undeclared work (i.e. the transactions in which private 
individuals were one of the involved parties).   
To get an insight into exact rationales for people to rely on informal transactions 
rather than to acquire goods/services by formal means, buyers were also asked the 
following question:  
 
As before, a list of possible rationales was offered. Multiple answers were possible. 
However, this particular question also referred solely to the most important good or 
service coming from undeclared work.  
Figure 14 reveals that 62% asserted that a cheaper price was their rationale for 
purchasing undeclared goods and services.  The second most important rationale for 
buyers seems to be a significant reduction of time necessary to obtain a good/service, 
which was recognised by every third individual as a sufficient reason for the breach of 
the law. What is more, every fourth survey participant highlighted better quality of 
goods and services delivered through the informal deals as the main reason for 
circumventing the legislation (see Figure 14). 
It is important to note that the findings on this matter further reinforce the social 
dimension of undeclared work in Croatia. Almost one quarter stated that they turned 
From the following, what made you buy it undeclared instead of buying it on 
the regular market? 
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to the undeclared economy simply to help someone in need of money, while for 
14.2% the purchase was a favour to their friends, relatives or acquaintances. 
 
Figure 14 An overview of the rationales for relying on undeclared means of 
payment, % of respondents admitting participation from the demand side 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Finally, only one in ten respondents justified their behaviour by the fact that the 
good/service in question was not available on the regular market. This suggests that 
the undeclared realm in Croatia is a parallel universe (i.e. offering same goods and 
services under different conditions). This became even more evident after confronting 
the survey participants with possible shortage of that specific good/service on the 
informal market. To see what they would do in such circumstances, the informal 
buyers were asked:  
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This time only one answer was allowed. The results on the matter, which are given in 
Figure 15, reveal that the majority of Croatians would simply switch to the regular 
market if the good or service they are interested in was not offered by individuals 
operating inside the undeclared realm. Such an outcome was acknowledged by six 
out of ten respondents, which therefore confirms that the undeclared economy in 
Croatia represents a substitute for the regular market, hence offering a quite similar 
range of goods and services.  
 
Figure 15 Action taken if the good/service was only available on the regular market, % 
of respondents admitting participation from the demand side 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
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There is also a group of individuals who would rather rely on self-provision in the case 
the good or product was not available on the undeclared market (accounting for 12% 
of all informal purchasers). What is more, approximately 10% of Croatian citizens 
would cancel the acquisition, while 7% of them would postpone the purchase.  
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4 Individuals residing between the formal and informal realms – an 
insight into envelope wage practices in Croatia 
Before switching to the supply side of undeclared work in Croatia, it is important to 
evaluate one specific form of tax evasion that resides half-way between the declared 
and undeclared realms. Commonly denoted as ‘under-declared employment’ or 
‘quasi-formal employment’, this is the practice where a formal employer pays a 
formal employee an official declared wage but also an addition undeclared (envelope) 
wage which is decided on the basis of an unwritten agreement beyond the formal 
written contract (Kedir, Fethi, & Williams, 2011; Sedlenieks, 2003; Williams, 2015b; 
Williams and Horodnic, 2015b, 2017; Woolfson, 2007). Only one part of the wage is 
therefore paid officially, while the rest is given under-the-table. Due to the prevalent 
custom among employers to give this undeclared part of the wage in an envelope, 
this phenomenon is in research literature also known under the name ‘envelope 
wage practices’ (Meriküll & Staehr, 2010; Williams, Horodnic, & Windebank, 2015; 
Williams & Padmore, 2013). 
Given the limited knowledge about this illegitimate wage arrangement, both in Croatia 
and elsewhere, the intention of the household survey was not only to try understanding 
roots of the problem, but also to grasp some key elements supporting this practice. To 
do so, the first step was to identify individuals receiving envelope wages. These 
individuals were then asked a set of questions related to the nature of their employment 
and their attitudes towards this practice.  
Before describing the results, it is necessary to stress one limitation of the approach 
chosen in the survey. The emphasis was solely on dependent employees as in their 
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case there are essentially two parties involved in decision about under-declaration 
(the worker and the employer). That is to say, self-employed individuals were not 
included. In line with this limitation, one must be aware that under-declared practices 
are more prevalent in Croatia than the results presented in this part of the report will 
suggest. 
This chapter starts with discussion about demographic, socio-economic and 
geographic features of envelope wage practices in Croatia, which is given in the first 
section. The second section then brings a more detailed insight into the nature of 
such employment.  
4.1 The structure of under-declared workforce - a descriptive overview 
As already mentioned, only the individuals who identified themselves as being formally 
employed under classical employment relations (part-time or full time dependent 
employees) were asked questions on envelope wage practices. While this approach 
enabled an insight into the complex structure of employer-employee relations in 
employment assuming under-declaration of wages (which does not exist in the case of 
self-employment), this came at the cost of the sample size. Only 47 under-declared 
workers were identified in Croatia by the survey, which is a rather insufficient number of 
cases for a robust statistical analysis. For that reason, the overview of under-declared 
workforce in Croatia will be done strictly in a descriptive manner. 
The first question asked was as follows: 
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In total, 6.6% of the surveyed dependent employees admitted receiving more than 
stated in their formal written contract, while 2% refused to answer this question and 
further 0.4% indicated they did not know. A detailed overview of the findings is given 
in Table 5. The first thing to notice from the given summary is that men more 
frequently admitted engagement in this illicit wage practice. While 7.7% of men 
stated they earn more than is declared to the authorities, only 5.5% of women did the 
same. This difference between genders is probably even more pronounced having in 
mind that men were more frequent to avoid providing the exact answer. Some 3.3% 
of men refused to answer or argued they do not know the answer, which is much 
higher than for women (1.3%). 
As expected, younger individuals seem to be more susceptible to this type of 
employment than older employees. However, one must be careful here since the 
share of individuals between 15 and 24 years of age engaged in under-declared 
employment is evidently inflated. This is a pure consequence of the limited size of the 
sample on the one hand and the fact that only one part of people in the youngest 
age category are actually eligible for work on the other hand. Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to assume that the role of experience in development of this practice is 
not as pronounced as suggested by the results of the survey.  
Sometimes employers prefer to pay all or part of the regular salary or the 
remuneration for extra work or overtime hours cash-in-hand and without 
declaring it to tax or social security authorities. Did your employer pay you all or 
part of your income in the last 12 months this way? 
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Yet, the comparison of the remaining age cohorts clearly indicates that age is indeed 
an important driver of under-declared employment in Croatia. For instance, while 
8.4% of individuals between 25 and 34 years of age admitted receiving more than is 
written in their work contract, this reduces to 2.3% among individuals aged 55-64. 
This finding is in line with the situation in other European countries (Kedir et al., 2011; 
Williams et al., 2015b). 
When it comes to marital status, Table 5 indicates that married individuals are less 
inclined to engage in under-declaration of wages than others. Only 3.3% of married 
participants identified themselves as quasi-formal workers, while this ratio accounts 
for more than 11% in the case of single and divorced people. Yet, akin to the situation 
with age, here we again have a problem with inflated numbers caused by small 
sample size. Namely, since there is no reason to assume that widowed individuals 
would be substantially more predisposed for under-declaration than the remaining 
groups (as suggested by the survey), such a high result for this category certainly does 
not reflect the situation in practice. 
The findings further suggest that individuals in larger households have a higher 
participation rate in envelope wage practices. For instance, while the participation rate 
for people whose household counts up to two members is below 6%, this increases to 
7.5% when there are more than three people in the household. 
Turning to the type of economic activity, it seems that agriculture (28.3%) and 
construction (16.1%) are the sectors facing the most profound problems with under-
declaration of wages in Croatia. Under-declaration is also prevalent among 
employees conducting various household services (15.5%) and those working in the 
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hospitality sector (9.4%). On the other hand, the lowest frequency of quasi-formal 
workers was recorded among individuals engaged in transport of goods (3.2%), as 
well as among those conducting various personal services (3.1%). 
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Table 5 Structure of under-declared workers in Croatia, % of surveyed dependent 
employees 
  Yes No Refusal DK 
G
e
n
d
e
r 
Male 7.7 89.0 2.4 0.9 
Female 5.5 93.2 1.3 0.0 
A
g
e
 
15 – 24 22.3 75.7 2.0 0.0 
25 – 34 8.4 91.2 0.4 0.0 
35 – 44 5.1 90.9 3.4 0.6 
45 – 54 3.5 94.5 1.4 0.6 
55 – 64 2.3 93.2 3.5 1.0 
65+ 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
M
a
rt
ia
l 
st
a
tu
s (Re)Married 3.3 94.6 1.6 0.5 
Cohabiting 8.6 87.1 4.3 0.0 
Single 11.6 87.1 1.3 0.0 
Divorced 11.3 84.5 1.8 2.4 
Widowed 16.2 83.8 0.0 0.0 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 
si
ze
 
One  5.8 93.2 1.0 0.0 
Two 5.6 90.5 3.1 0.8 
Three 6.8 91.7 0.9 0.6 
Four or more 7.5 89.9 2.2 0.4 
S
e
ct
o
r 
Construction 16.1 79.4 4.5 0.0 
Industry 6.7 90.1 3.2 0.0 
Household services (incl. gardening, 
child and elderly care) 
15.5 84.5 0.0 0.0 
Transport 3.2 89.1 7.7 0.0 
Personal services 3.1 93.2 2.0 1.7 
Retail 7.5 90.7 1.8 0.0 
Repair services 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
Hospitality (hotels, restaurant, cafes) 9.4 89.7 0.9 0.0 
Agriculture 28.3 58.2 13.5 0.0 
Other 4.2 94.8 0.6 0.4 
T
y
p
e
 o
f 
co
n
tr
a
ct
 
Full-time 6.8 90.7 2.0 0.5 
Part-time 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
si
tu
a
ti
o
n
 Struggling 10.0 87.8 1.5 0.7 
Maintaining 7.3 91.5 1.2 0.0 
Just comfortable 3.6 92.3 3.2 0.9 
No money problems 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
E
st
im
a
te
d
 s
h
a
re
 
o
f 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
 i
n
 U
W
 
Less than 5% 5.4 90.0 4.6 0.0 
5 to 10% 4.3 93.8 0.5 1.4 
10 to 20% 2.8 96.1 0.4 0.7 
20 to 50% 8.8 89.5 1.7 0.0 
50% or more 12.8 76.5 9.1 1.6 
P
e
rc
e
iv
e
d
 
d
e
te
ci
o
n
 r
is
k
 
Very small 7.6 89.0 2.7 0.7 
Fairly small 7.2 90.8 1.6 0.4 
Fairly high 5.4 92.9 1.0 0.7 
Very high 7.5 92.5 0.0 0.0 
E
xp
e
ct
e
d
 
sa
n
ct
io
n
s Tax + contributions 5.2 91.4 2.5 0.9 
Tax + contributions + fine 7.9 91.0 1.1 0.0 
Prison 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
T
a
x 
m
o
ra
le
 
<2 5.6 92.4 1.8 0.2 
2-4 7.5 90.6 1.9 0.0 
4-6 7.3 88.8 3.9 0.0 
6-8 11.5 78.5 0.0 10.0 
8-10 42.8 57.2 0.0 0.0 
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T
y
p
e
 o
f 
co
m
m
u
n
. 
Rural area or village 7.1 90.6 1.4 0.9 
Small or middle sized town 6.2 90.5 3.3 0.0 
Large town 6.6 92.0 0.8 0.6 
R
e
g
io
n
 
Zagreb 5.7 93.0 1.3 0.0 
North Croatia 10.9 85.5 1.7 1.9 
Slavonia 3.4 96.6 0.0 0.0 
Lika and Banovina 6.0 94.0 0.0 0.0 
Istria. Primorje and Gorski Kotar 8.0 90.4 1.6 0.0 
Dalmatia 5.7 87.9 5.5 0.9 
Total  6.6 91.0 2.0 0.4 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
An interesting finding is that all individuals who admitted receiving higher wages than 
declared to the authorities were in fact full-time employees. It must be, however, 
emphasised that the question on the type of the job (full-time vs part-time) was 
concerned with the situation in reality, not in their contract. It is thus possible that 
many workers who were officially part-time workers were in fact working on a full-
time basis. Indeed, the discussion presented in the next section will disclose an 
evident link between the working time of a worker and their propensity to receive 
envelope wages.  
Before that, it is important to inspect other aspects of this practice in Croatia. Starting 
with financial situation, Table 5 indicates that under-declared workers are far more 
likely to face difficulties making ends meet. This practice was not recorded among 
dependent employees having no money problems at all, while only 3.6% describing 
their financial position as ‘just comfortable’ admitted to receiving envelope wages. 
On the other hand, one out of ten survey respondents struggling to pay their financial 
liabilities received envelope wages. Yet, although this finding undoubtedly confirms 
an association between under-declared employment and personal wealth, it says 
nothing about the direction of causality. Namely, it is possible that under-declaration 
of wages is actually a cause of a poor financial situation for many workers, not a 
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consequence. Nonetheless, it is not possible to test which direction is true based on 
the available data. 
Tax morale also seems to be positively correlated with one’s propensity to receive 
envelope wages, while deterrence appears not to be particularly important for 
workers. With respect to the perceived prevalence of undeclared work (i.e., horizontal 
trust), the share of under-declared workers gradually increases from 5.4% (among 
those who think that less than 5% of population operates undeclared) to 12.8% (for 
those believing that the majority operate undeclared). Similarly, while 5.6% of 
individuals with the highest level of tax morale participate in the quasi-formal realm, 
this increases to 11.5% for those mostly tolerating noncompliant behaviour12. Yet, a 
note of caution is required. It is reasonable to assume that two-way causality is in place 
for both variables: the very fact that someone works on an under-declared basis 
possibly leads them to conclude that disobedience with the legislation is more frequent 
in society than it really is, as well as to express greater tolerance towards such 
behaviour. 
When it comes to the perceived risk of being detected, the findings indicate that 
individuals who think the risk is very high were slightly more likely to admit receiving 
envelope wages (7.5%) than those who think the risk is fairly small (7.2%). Under-
declaration of wages also appears to be more common among dependent employees 
who are certain that a financial fine will result alongside taxes and contributions due if 
caught (7.9%) than among those who do not expect any additional penalty (5.2%). A 
plausible explanation for this rather unusual finding is that employees do not 
                                                          
12 Due to the plausible inflation of numbers related to the individuals with the lowest tax morale, they are 
not discussed here. 
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consider themselves as being responsible for under-declaration and therefore expect 
that their employer is the only one which will be prosecuted by the authorities.  
Finally, there are regional differences with regards to the prevalence of under-
declared employment. Envelope wage practices are most prevalent in North Croatia 
(10.9%), followed by Istria, Primorje and Gorski Kotar (8.0%). On the other hand, 
Slavonia is the region were this phenomenon appears to be least rooted, since only 
3.4% of participants from that part of Croatia admitted receiving envelope wages. 
However, although the results presented in Table 5 reveal that people living in rural 
areas are somewhat more frequently engaged in this practice than those from towns, 
the difference is not so substantial to enable firm conclusions in this respect.  
Having enumerated these characteristics of quasi-formal employment in Croatia, we 
now move to a more detailed insight into the mechanisms behind this illegitimate 
arrangement. As explained earlier, the survey respondents identifying themselves as 
quasi-formal workers were asked several additional questions, which were directly 
related to that particular job. The next section reports the most important findings. 
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4.2 The most important characteristics of quasi-formal employment in Croatia 
Since under-declared employment is in fact a result of mutual agreement between a 
worker and their employer, it is interesting to see to what extent each of the two 
parties drives this practice in Croatia. To start unfolding this issue, every quasi-formal 
worker was asked the following question:   
 
As anticipated, three different answers were possible: the employer initiated the 
arrangement; the worker requested to be under-declared; and under-declaration was 
a joint idea. As Figure 16 reveals, under-declaration in Croatia is most commonly an 
initiative of the employer in seven out of every ten cases encountered. This finding is 
not surprising given that the benefits employers have from this type of 
noncompliance significantly outweigh their cost, which cannot be claimed to hold 
true for workers (Hazans, 2005; Round, Williams, & Rodgers, 2008; Sedlenieks, 2003; 
Woolfson, 2007). 
Figure 16 Under-declared employment in Croatia by initiator, % of envelope wage 
earners 
Who suggested paying this additional salary which would not be declared to 
the authorities? 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Yet, it seems that many Croatian workers do find their own interest in concealment of 
one part of their wages. As a matter of fact, 30.5% of the identified quasi-formal 
workers confirmed that they were active initiators of this arrangement. Yet, in most 
cases this was a joint idea, while only a small proportion of such arrangements was 
done exclusively on the initiative of the employee (accounting for 10.1% of the total 
quasi-formal workforce). 
The next step to understand the motivation of the involved parties for engaging in 
this illicit wage practice was to evaluate the nature of the hidden agreement between 
them. To do so, every quasi-formal worker was also asked this question: 
 
Worker requested to be under-
declared
10%
It was a joint idea
20%
Under-declaration initiated by 
employer
70%
Did you verbally agree with your employer to any of the following conditions in 
return for receiving this additional cash-in-hand payment? 
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A set of plausible extra conditions was offered and every respondent was allowed to 
choose more than one answer. As Figure 17 reveals, in 38.8% of cases, no additional 
conditions were attached to the receipt of an additional undeclared envelope wage. 
This therefore suggests that in a substantial proportion of cases under-declaration is 
probably nothing more than a simple tax evasion strategy by employers.   
Figure 17 An overview of extra conditions that accompanied under-declaration of 
wages, % of envelope wage earners 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
In majority of cases, however, there was indeed one or more additional conditions 
attached to the receipt of envelope wages. Every third worker receiving an envelope 
wage was asked to work longer hours than is in their official contract in return for 
their envelope wage. A quarter receiving envelope wages also mentioned that they 
were asked to conduct different tasks than those stated in their formal work contract. 
Finally, approximately one in five under-declared workers in Croatia were expected 
not to take their full statutory holiday allowance, which indicates the exploitative 
nature of quasi-formal employment in this South-East European country. 
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Turning to the undeclared part of the wage, two different questions were asked, one 
aimed at examining the exact function of envelope wages, while the other was 
concerned with the exact share of the total wage that remains undeclared. The first 
question was structured as follows: 
 
The results summarised in Figure 18 reveal that in almost one half of the cases, 
envelope wages represented nothing more than one part of the total payment for 
regular work. This further reinforces the notion that quasi-formal employment in 
Croatia primarily serves as an efficient tax evasion strategy. That is to say, it seems 
that the majority of employers simply divide the agreed take-home pay of their 
workers into two parts, whereas taxes and social security contributions are not paid 
on the slice that remains underreported.  
Yet, in 28.9% of cases envelope wages actually represented remuneration for work 
beyond the one stated in the contract. Such a prevalence of cash payments for 
overtime and/or extra work suggests that for many employers in Croatia this 
illegitimate practice also serves as an efficient means of circumventing certain aspects 
of labour legislation. Yet, this could also indicate that reliance on envelope wages 
actually represents a useful strategy to cope with business fluctuations, as the 
practice gives a possibility for employers to increase workload of the existing personal 
(which would be paid in cash) instead of employing new workers in the case of 
Was this income part of the remuneration for your regular work, was it payment 
for overtime hours or was it both? 
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temporary growth in demand. Finally, every fourth quasi-formal employee stated that 
their envelope wages covered both regular and overtime work (see Figure 18), which 
presumably makes it very hard for them to draw a line between invested efforts and 
received take-home pay. 
Figure 18 The exact role of envelope wages, % of quasi-formal workers 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
The second question was concerned with the relative size of envelope wages, as 
follows:  
 
As However, it is interesting that a large proportion of individuals did not give a clear 
answer to this question. While such a large proportion of ‘refusals’ is not so 
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Approximately what percentage share of your net monthly income from this job 
did you get this way? 
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surprising given the sensitivity of the question, this cannot be said in the case of ‘do 
not know’ answers. The latter probably indicates significant variability in the size of 
envelope wages from one month to another, which made it impossible for many survey 
participants to give a reasonable estimate. Indeed, this reasoning is in line with the 
outcomes from the preceding question, which revealed that envelope wages are closely 
related to overtime work for great many quasi-formal workers in Croatia.  
Figure 19 displays, 31.4% of quasi-formal workers stated that up to 20% of their take-
home pay was given in cash, while for a further 29.2% of them cash payments 
comprised 21-40% of the earnings. On the other hand, only 10.5% of the surveyed 
envelope wage earners specified that the unreported parts of their wages were as 
high as or even slightly larger than the declared net income. As expected, situations in 
which the declared wage represents just a minor part of the total remuneration are 
extremely rare in practice. 
However, it is interesting that a large proportion of individuals did not give a clear 
answer to this question. While such a large proportion of ‘refusals’ is not so 
surprising given the sensitivity of the question, this cannot be said in the case of ‘do 
not know’ answers. The latter probably indicates significant variability in the size of 
envelope wages from one month to another, which made it impossible for many survey 
participants to give a reasonable estimate. Indeed, this reasoning is in line with the 
outcomes from the preceding question, which revealed that envelope wages are closely 
related to overtime work for great many quasi-formal workers in Croatia.  
Figure 19 The proportion of total net income received in cash, % of quasi-formal 
workers 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
A further important issue is the link between envelope wage practices and the 
legislation on minimum wage. Namely, there has been a prevalent belief among 
academics and experts that employers most often tend to satisfy only the minimum 
required by the law in terms of official payment, therefore identifying low income 
earners as the ones being most susceptible to envelope wage practices (Elek, Köllő, 
Reizer, & Szabó, 2011; OECD, 2003). To test the validity of the above statement for 
Croatia, envelope wage earners were also asked the following question: 
 
31.4
29.2
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0.0
1.7
27.2
0
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up to 20% 21-40% 41-60% 61-80% more than 80% Refusal/DK
Which of the following best describes your officially gross declared salary for 
this job: 
 
the salary equals the minimum wage;  
the salary is above the minimum wage;  
the salary is below the minimum wage? 
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The interviewers were instructed to clearly state the exact size of the minimum wage 
for 2015 in case the respondent had not known that information. The outcome is that 
the behaviour of employers relying on envelope wages in Croatia is indeed 
substantially determined by the legislation on minimum wage. As Figure 20 illustrates, 
almost one half of the quasi-formal workers received exactly the minimum prescribed 
amount as their declared wage.  
Figure 20 Relation between the declared part of the wage within quasi-formal 
employment and minimum wage proscribed by the law, % of quasi-formal workers 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
A further 27.8% of quasi-formal workers recognised that their declared wage was 
higher than proscribed by the law, while 18% classified their official part of the wage 
as being below the minimum. The latter are essentially those registered as part-time 
workers.  
The last matter to scrutinise is employees’ attitudes to receiving an envelope wage, 
as reflected in the following question:  
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As Figure 21 reveals, the majority believe that the negative aspects of this practice 
outweigh all benefits that it brings to them and therefore would rather prefer full 
declaration. This further reinforces the earlier finding that this practice is more 
beneficial for employers. Yet a non-negligible prefer being paid in this manner; 18.9% 
described being paid in this manner as positive, implying that they are happy with 
this arrangement. Finally, almost every fourth employee paid in this manner was not 
sure whether they are in better position than their counterparts who are completely 
declared.  
Figure 21 The level of satisfaction with own position, % of quasi-formal workers 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Would prefer full declaration, 
54.5%
It depends, 23.4% 
Happy with this, 18.9%
Refusal, 3.2%
Were you happy getting part of your salary without having it declared to the tax 
or social security authorities or would you have preferred to have had your total 
gross salary declared? 
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 Under-declaration is mostly 
initiated by employers. 
 
 Envelope wages commonly 
comprise up to 40% of the total 
net income. 
 
 Every second quasi-formal 
employee receives the minimum 
wage as their declared waged. 
 
 Most workers would prefer to 
be fully declared. 
 
Envelope wage practices in Croatia – key facts 
 6.6% of dependent employees 
in Croatia receive envelope 
wages. 
 
 This practice is more frequent 
among men and younger 
individuals.  
 
 Agriculture and the 
construction industry are highly 
susceptible to such 
arrangements. 
 
 Financial situation and tax 
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5 Supply side of undeclared work in Croatia 
The survey component examining the supply of undeclared work was designed in a 
similar manner to the previous issues. In the first step every single respondent was 
asked whether they had been conducting any paid activity without reporting income to 
the authorities. Those who answered positively were then asked a set of supplementary 
questions in order to get an in-depth insight into this practice from the perspective of 
workers. 
The structure applied here is thus identical to that pursued in Chapter 4. First we give 
a descriptive overview of undeclared workers according to their demographic and 
socio-economic characteristics. In the second stage the issue is further examined by 
applying logit modelling so as to determine which of those characteristics indeed play 
a significant role in the decision-making process of workers in this respect. The 
discussion is then continued by summarising the most important findings on the 
exact goods and services provided, main motivations of workers to engage in 
undeclared work, as well as on the people who bought these goods and services and 
the income generated by informal means of payment. 
5.1 The structure of undeclared workforce in Croatia – a descriptive overview 
To assess engagement in undeclared work in Croatia, the following question was 
asked: 
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In total, 9.2% of the surveyed individuals admitted to have been engaged in some 
sort of undeclared work during the year prior to the survey. A further 1.6% refused to 
answer, while 0.6% did not know whether they were carrying out such activities. 
Finally, 88.6% of the research participants denied participation in undeclared work. A 
detailed overview of the matter is given in Table 6. Starting with the demographic 
characteristics, 12.9% of men acknowledged engagement in undeclared work, but just 
5.8% of women. That is to say, men were some 2.2 times more frequent to admit 
conducting unregistered activities than women. The difference is probably even more 
pronounced as men more often refused to answer. 
Table 6 further reveals that the youngest age groups much frequently carry out 
unregistered economic activities than older members of society. Undeclared work was 
admitted by 14% of the surveyed individuals between 15 and 24 years of age, which is 
substantially more than in the case of population aged 25-44 (10.9%). On the other 
hand, only 6.5% of the individuals from the age cohort 55-64 classified themselves as 
undeclared workers, while this share was even lower for those above 65 years of age 
(3.1%). 
Yet the findings on the link between marital status and propensity to participate in 
undeclared work from the supply side do not reveal any clear pattern. Interestingly, 
one in five individuals in cohabitation carried out some unregistered activity during 
Did you yourself carry out any undeclared paid activities in the last 12 months? 
Here we mean again activities which you were paid for which were not or not 
fully reported to the tax authorities.   
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the last 12 months, which represents a substantially larger prevalence of this practice 
than in any other group. In comparison, the participation rate for single people, which 
is the second most frequent group, is 11.5%. Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
explicate reasons behind this peculiarity based on the available data. Whatever the 
reason, it is worth mentioning that married and widowed individuals were identified 
as the least likely to work undeclared, with unregistered workforce accounting only 
for 7.2% and 4.2% of the total population within these two groups respectively. 
When it comes to household size, one can see that large households are more likely 
to have participants engaging in undeclared work. For instance, while only 6% of 
respondents sharing their household with one person answered positively to this 
question, this share accounted for 11.8% in the case of people living with three or 
more people under the same roof. 
Employment status is important. It is noticeable from Table 6 that unemployed 
individuals are more likely to work undeclared; 17.8% of the individuals excluded from 
the regular labour market admitted to carrying out unregistered activities, which 
further reinforces the earlier conclusion that the undeclared economy in Croatia to a 
large degree represents a substitute for the formal economy.  
The second most susceptible employment status group in this respect are self-
employed individuals, 11.3% of whom identified themselves as participants in the 
undeclared realm. They are followed by inactive individuals (mainly students), with a 
participation rate of 10.9%. On the other hand, this rate is much lower for dependent 
employees (8.6%), who less frequently work on an undeclared basis than the 
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aforementioned groups. Finally, undeclared work is least common among pensioners, 
as only 4.6% of them admitted such behaviour. 
 
Table 6 Suppliers of undeclared goods and services in Croatia, % of surveyed 
individuals 
  Yes No Refusal DK 
G
e
n
d
e
r 
Male 12.9 84.4 2.3 0.4 
Female 5.8 92.5 0.8 0.9 
A
g
e
 
15 - 24 14.0 84.2 0.7 1.1 
25 - 34 10.9 85.9 2.5 0.7 
35 - 44 10.9 85.7 2.5 0.9 
45 - 54 11.7 86.8 1.5 0.0 
55 - 64 6.5 91.8 1.1 0.6 
65+ 3.1 95.0 1.2 0.7 
M
a
rt
ia
l 
st
a
tu
s (Re)Married 7.2 90.5 1.8 0.5 
Cohabiting 19.6 75.7 4.0 0.7 
Single 11.5 86.7 1.0 0.8 
Divorced 8.4 90.5 0.0 1.1 
Widowed 4.2 95.0 0.0 0.8 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 
si
ze
 
One  8.3 90.2 0.8 0.7 
Two 6.0 91.9 1.7 0.4 
Three 10.2 87.7 1.8 0.3 
Four or more 11.8 85.4 1.7 1.1 
O
cc
u
p
a
ti
o
n
 Dependent employee 8.6 88.3 2.4 0.7 
Self-employed 11.3 87.5 1.2 0.0 
Unemployed 17.8 80.3 1.4 0.5 
Retired 4.6 93.9 0.9 0.6 
Inactive (students. disabled. etc.) 10.9 87.3 0.8 1.0 
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
si
tu
a
ti
o
n
 Struggling 11.1 87.1 1.1 0.7 
Maintaining 7.7 90.0 1.6 0.7 
Just comfortable 8.3 89.1 2.1 0.5 
No money problems 14.4 81.4 4.2 0.0 
N
e
t 
in
co
m
e
 f
ro
m
 f
o
rm
a
l 
w
o
rk
 
0 14.1 84.8 0.8 0.3 
1-2,500 9.5 89.5 0.6 0.4 
2,501-5,000 7.7 90.1 1.4 0.8 
5,001-7,500 8.1 90.8 1.1 0.0 
7,501-10,000 4.0 96.0 0.0 0.0 
10,001-15,000 15.2 84.8 0.0 0.0 
More than 15,000 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
E
st
im
a
te
d
 s
h
a
re
 
o
f 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
 i
n
 U
W
 
Less than 5% 1.9 95.1 3.0 0.0 
5 to 10% 4.5 93.9 0.6 1.0 
10 to 20% 7.3 91.0 1.2 0.5 
20 to 50% 11.3 86.9 1.4 0.4 
50% or more 14.7 81.1 3.9 0.3 
P
e
rc
e
iv
e
d
 
d
e
te
ci
o
n
 r
is
k
 
Very small 9.6 88.1 1.6 0.7 
Fairly small 9.7 88.5 1.5 0.3 
Fairly high 7.3 90.6 1.1 1.0 
Very high 10.6 88.8 0.0 0.6 
E
xp e
ct e
d
 
sa
n
ct
i
o
n s T x + contributions 10.1 88.1 1.6 0.2 
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Tax + contributions + fine 8.1 90.4 1.2 0.3 
Prison 6.4 91.9 0.0 1.7 
T
a
x 
m
o
ra
le
 
<2 7.2 91.3 1.0 0.5 
2-4 11.4 85.6 2.1 0.9 
4-6 15.8 78.7 4.7 0.8 
6-8 16.8 81.0 2.2 0.0 
8-10 14.1 85.9 0.0 0.0 
T
y
p
e
 o
f 
co
m
m
u
n
. 
Rural area or village 10.6 87.3 1.4 0.7 
Small or middle sized town 9.1 88.0 2.1 0.8 
Large town 7.0 91.6 1.0 0.4 
R
e
g
io
n
 
Zagreb 7.5 90.6 1.0 0.9 
North Croatia 10.2 88.0 0.9 0.9 
Slavonia 12.8 86.4 0.8 0.0 
Lika and Banovina 6.0 91.6 1.4 1.0 
Istria. Primorje and Gorski Kotar 12.2 85.0 2.8 0.0 
Dalmatia 6.9 89.6 2.7 0.8 
Total  9.2 88.6 1.6 0.6 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
 
 
 
When it comes to the link between financial status and propensity to participate in 
the undeclared economy, findings are in line with those from other transition 
countries (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Gërxhani, 2011). Namely, citizens placed on the 
two extremes in terms of financial position seem to far more frequently engage in 
undeclared work than the rest of population. As Table 6 reveals, individuals without 
any financial problems were the group of citizens with the highest participation rate 
(14.4%). This is much higher even than for those who were struggling to survive on a 
daily basis (11.1%). However, both these groups appear to be far more frequently 
engaged in undeclared work than the members in the middle.  
A similar conclusion is reached when examining how net income is related to the 
propensity to work on an undeclared basis. Again, two peripheral groups dominate in 
this respect. Yet, while the participation rate of 14.1% for those that do not conduct 
any formal work is not so surprising given the earlier findings on the association 
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between unemployment and undeclared work, the fact that 15.2% of the individuals 
earning more than HRK 10,000 in the formal economy also participate in the informal 
realm reveals quite a lot about the exact role of undeclared work in Croatia13. More 
precisely, based on these findings one can argue that undeclared work in Croatia 
actually has a twofold role: on the one hand, it enables relatively well-off individuals 
to earn even more money. On the other hand, the undeclared economy seems to 
absorb the army of individuals excluded from the formal market, who are forced to 
accept low-paid unregistered jobs simply to make their ends meet.   
The findings on attitudes are quite similar to those for the demand side of undeclared 
work and envelope wage practices. Starting with the estimated pervasiveness of 
unregistered economic activities, this factor indeed seems to be substantially 
associated with one’s propensity to engage in undeclared work. Table 6 displays 
that less than 2% of individuals who think that disobedience with tax and labour 
legislation is a negligible issue in Croatia were personally engaged in such behaviour, 
while this share gradually rises to 14.7% for those who think that not many people 
can be trusted in this respect. As before, one must however be aware that the 
opposite direction is also plausible, i.e. that those who are working on an undeclared 
basis tend to perceive this practice as more prevalent than it really is.  
A similar state of affairs is detected in the case of tax morale, as there is an evidence 
that a decrease in tax morale results in an increased inclination to engage in cash-in-
hand activities. While 7.2% of the individuals with the highest tax morale admitted to 
participate in the undeclared economy, this was 11.4% among those with the values 
                                                          
13 The average net wage in 2015 accounted for HRK 5,711 (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2016b). In 
addition, only 6.6% of persons in employment were earning more than 10,000 at that time (Croatian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2016a), which classifies this group as 'wealthy individuals'. 
      
95 | P a g e  
 
of the index between two and four. The participation rate further increases with 
decline of tax morale, as evident when inspecting the results for individuals whose 
index falls in the interval 4-6 (15.8%) and 6-8 (16.8%).  
Turning to the effect of policy measures, the findings once again suggest that only 
the perceived penalties possibly play an important role in this regard. The 
participation rate reduces to approximately 2% with the increase of the perceived 
penalty. While 10.1% of those who do not expect any additional penalty besides taxes 
and social security contributions due admitted participation in the undeclared realm, 
this share accounted for 8.1% for the category of people expecting a financial fine. 
Only 6.4% of individuals who believed that one can be imprisoned if caught were 
identified as undeclared workers. 
On the other hand, the perceived detection risk seems to be quite irrelevant. The 
highest proportion of undeclared workers was identified among individuals who 
believed that this risk is very high (10.6%). In comparison, those who think the risk is 
negligible have a participation rate of 9.6%. 
Finally, the results also suggest that undeclared work is most common in rural areas 
of Croatia. More than one in ten respondents in rural areas had been carrying out 
some unregistered activities during the 12-month period prior the survey. The 
participation rate for small and middle sized towns was 9.1%, while only 7% of the 
citizens living in large towns relied on unregistered sources of income.  
This state of affairs is also reflected in the regional distribution of undeclared work. As 
Table 6 shows, undeclared work is most prevalent in Slavonia (12.8%), as well as in 
Istria, Primorje and Gorski Kotar (12.2%). On the other hand, the findings suggest that 
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Lika and Dalmatia face much less pronounced problems with the supply of 
undeclared goods and services than other parts of the country, with participation 
rates accounting for 6.0% and 6.9% respectively in these two regions. 
However, it is not possible to make firm conclusions about the effect of the 
demographic, social-economic and geographical variables on the propensity to 
participate in undeclared work simply based on this descriptive overview. This can 
only be done using a rigorous statistical approach, which scrutinises these covariates 
in parallel. In line with this, the next section brings the results of the logit modelling, 
with a binary indicator denoting whether or not a person participated in the 
undeclared economy being the dependent variable.  
5.2 Determinants of the propensity to carry out undeclared work in Croatia – findings 
from the logit modelling 
Before presenting the results, it is important to stress that the approach applied here 
completely matches the one pursued in section 3.2. First of all, marital status, size of 
one’s household and net income from formal work were again omitted due to 
multicollinearity issues, which resulted in the identical set of ten covariates as in the 
earlier analysis of the propensity to purchase undeclared goods and services. Also, 
age and the tax morale were again used in their original form, i.e. as interval variables. 
Finally, the multiple imputation technique with 25 imputed values was applied to 
address the problem with missing data.  
The results of the logit modelling, presented in Table 7, reveal a slightly different state 
of affairs in comparison with the descriptive insight. The most important difference is 
that age is not significantly associated with the likelihood of carrying out undeclared 
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work. A plausible reason for this outcome is that age was entered as an interval 
variable here, but there are also other possible explanations. For instance, it might be 
that other characteristics affect the propensity to work undeclared which are in turn 
dependent on age14. Whatever the case, it is important to state that the obtained 
coefficient for age has a negative sign as expected and the accompanying p-value is 
quite close to the threshold level.  
In contrast, the findings reinforce the earlier anticipation that women are significantly 
less inclined to work undeclared than men. The conducted logit analysis also confirms 
the importance of employment status. Unemployed and self-employed individuals 
are far more likely to work undeclared. Yet the results on financial situation do not 
match those suggested by the descriptive insight. The propensity to participate in 
undeclared work is not conditional upon their self-assessed financial position. It is 
important to note that this finding does not refute the earlier theory about the 
twofold nature of undeclared work, as it only shows that financial situation per se 
does not significantly influence decisions regarding participation.  
This logit model also confirms that those perceived undeclared work as widespread 
are more likely to do so themselves, that the perceived detection risk does not 
influence participation, but that the expected sanctions are significantly associated 
with the likelihood of participation15.  
                                                          
14 Tax morale is one of such characteristics (see Frey & Torgler, 2007). 
15 Note that the coefficient for those who expect to be sent to prison is not significant, but the 
accompanying p-value is however quite close the the treshold level. 
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i  Standard error 
    
Female -1.070*** 0.192 
   
Age -0.014 0.008 
   
Occupation (RC: Unemployed)   
Dependent employee -0.637* 0.248 
Self-employed -0.644 0.503 
Retired -1.164** 0.361 
Inactive (students, disabled, etc.) -0.660* 0.326 
   
Financial situation (RC: Struggling)   
 Maintaining -0.272 0.221 
Just comfortable -0.373 0.261 
No money problems 0.661 0.724 
   
Estimated share of population engaged in UW 
 (RC: More than 50%) 
  
Less than 5% -3.055** 1.107 
5 to 10% -1.647*** 0.465 
10 to 20% -0.873** 0.315 
20 to 50% -0.425 0.240 
   
Perceived detection risk (RC: Very small)   
Fairly small -0.264 0.232 
Fairly high -0.591* 0.287 
Very high -0.163 0.327 
    
Expected sanctions (RC: Tax + social security 
contributions due) 
  
Tax + contributions + fine -0.456* 0.217 
Prison -1.197 0.626 
    
Tax morale 0.193*** 0.045 
   
Type of community (RC: Rural area or village)   
Small or middle sized town -0.427 0.222 
Large town -0.784** 0.286 
    
Region (RC: Zagreb and surroundings)   
North Croatia -0.139 0.329 
Slavonia 0.074 0.315 
Lika and Banovina -0.719 0.485 
Istria, Primorje and Gorski Kotar 0.103 0.316 
Dalmatia -0.477 0.318 
    
Const 0.623 0.510 
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Table 7 Determinants of propensity to conduct undeclared work in Croatia, results of 
the logit model 
Significance: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Akin to purchasing and envelope wages, tax morale was once again found to be 
significant. Lower tax morale is significantly associated with a higher propensity to 
conduct undeclared work. This therefore confirms that tax morale is an important factor.  
Finally, the results on the geographical aspects of the supply side of undeclared work 
are different than one would assume based on the descriptive insight. The region in 
which one lives is not per se significantly associated with participation. Yet people 
from larger towns are significantly less likely to work undeclared than their 
counterparts from smaller towns and rural areas. These results largely confirm many 
previous studies on undeclared work in both South-East European and the European 
Union (Williams and Franic, 2016b; Williams and Horodnic, 2015a,c,d, 2016b,c; 
Williams and Kayaoglu, 2016; Williams et al., 2014, 2015a, 2016). 
5.3 A deeper insight into the labour supply side of undeclared work in Croatia  
As was the case with the purchasing undeclared goods and services, and envelope 
wages, suppliers were asked several supplementary questions to further develop 
understanding of undeclared work in Croatia. In this section we give a descriptive 
elaboration on these matters, alongside comparison with the findings on the same 
topics from the demand side, which were discussed in Chapter 3. We start with the 
Number of observations 2,000 
Number of imputations 25 
Prob > F 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.154 
Area under ROC 0.780 
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exact goods and services that the surveyed individuals supplied during the prior 12 
months. The question was as follows: 
 
The list of activities mostly reflected the ones given to the purchasers, but 
respondents were again allowed to provide answers that were not necessarily on the 
list. Indeed, for one third of the respondents their activity did not match any of those 
suggested by the interviewers, as illustrated in This is additionally confirmed by the 
fact that 21.4% of the surveyed undeclared workers were engaged in home repair and 
maintenance activities. Some 8.5% of the undeclared workers were selling their own 
agricultural products.  
 
 
Figure 22. A closer insight into raw data revealed that the respondents most often 
mentioned seasonal work in agriculture and construction, as well as repairs of various 
electronic devices and clothes. These findings further reinforce the earlier conclusion 
about the pervasiveness of undeclared work in agriculture and the construction 
industry. 
This is additionally confirmed by the fact that 21.4% of the surveyed undeclared 
workers were engaged in home repair and maintenance activities. Some 8.5% of the 
undeclared workers were selling their own agricultural products.  
Which of the following activities have you carried out undeclared in the last 12 
months? 
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Figure 22 An overview of activities carried out on an undeclared basis, % of 
respondents admitting participation from the labour supply side 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Informal car repairs were admitted by 10.1% of the workers, which is again in line with 
the previous findings based on demand for undeclared work in Croatia. Coincidence 
between the two sides of the phenomenon becomes also evident when the activities 
conducted in or around one’s home are examined. As can be seen, such activities 
are not as frequent a source of undeclared work in Croatia as is the case in other EU-
member states (European Commission, 2007, 2014). 
Waitressing on an undeclared basis seems not to be so prevalent an issue in Croatia. 
Only 6.8% of the undeclared workers admitted working as a waiter/waitress. One 
possible explanation can be that such jobs are more likely to be under-declared 
rather than fully undeclared, as suggested by the findings on envelope wage practices 
(see Table 5 in section 4.1). 
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The second question was related to the buyers of goods and services supplied by the 
surveyed undeclared workers. To see the type of people most frequently on the 
opposite side of transaction, every individual was instructed to focus on the most 
important activity they conducted on an undeclared basis in order to answer the 
following question: 
 
The list of offered socio-economic groups completely matched that in the case of 
purchasers (see section 3.3), but again the respondents were allowed to give their 
own answer. As Figure 23 reveals, these reflect the insights from the demand side. 
Namely, friends, colleagues and acquaintances were identified as the final buyers in 
more than one half of the cases, which further reinforces the social dimension of 
undeclared economic practices in Croatia.  
Figure 23 The structure of the buyers of undeclared goods and services in Croatia, % 
of respondents admitting participation from the labour supply side 
Among the following, would you please indicate for whom did you carry out 
this activity? 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Again, however, neighbours and relatives were once again detected as not 
particularly important stakeholders in the process. Neighbours were on the other side 
of the business transaction in 5.7% of the identified cases. In the same time, the 
good/service was supplied to relatives only in 2.4% of the undeclared trades. Private 
persons and households with whom the supplier has no firm social ties were 
identified as the second most important group in this respect (accounting for 22.2% 
of undeclared purchasers). This is also expected having in mind the findings on the 
matter from the demand side, as described in section 3.3. The same conclusion holds 
true regarding the role of firms and business, given that 12.9% of the surveyed 
undeclared workers identified companies as buyers of their goods and services. 
To additionally scrutinise the key factors behind undeclared work in Croatia, every 
undeclared worker was also asked to provide their rationales for working undeclared: 
Friends, colleagues  or 
acquaintances, 50.9%
Other private persons or 
households, 22.2%
Firms or businesses, 12.9%
Neighbours, 5.7%
Other, 3.1% Refusal/DK, 2.8% Relatives, 2.4%
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Multiple answers were possible and these were not limited solely to the offered list of 
potential rationales. Figure 24 reveals that rationales of the suppliers do not completely 
match those of the buyers of undeclared goods and services in Croatia. Both social and 
economic rationales play an equally important role on the part of suppliers. In one third 
of cases, undeclared work was justified by prevalent social norms as a normal way of 
operating among friends/neighbours/relatives, and therefore they did not see anything 
wrong in such behaviour. Social aspects of undeclared work are further manifested 
through the fact that one in three undeclared transactions were motivated by helping 
people out.     
Yet economic reasons also play an important role. As Figure 24 illustrates, 32.1% of the 
surveyed undeclared workers admitted that mutual financial benefit of both 
stakeholders was a reason to conceal the transaction from the authorities. In addition, 
every fourth individual was engaged in unregistered activities simply due to the lack of 
formal employment, which therefore indicates that undeclared work may have more 
pronounced role in making ends meet than suggested by the statistical analysis 
presented in the previous section.  
Figure 24 An overview of the rationales for relying on undeclared work, % of 
respondents admitting participation from the labour supply side 
Among the following, what were the reasons for doing this activity undeclared? 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Yet, the intrusiveness of the state seems to be far less important than one would 
expect. For instance, only 8.2% of the respondents justified their behaviour by 
complicated bureaucratic procedures, and just 12% pointed at the high tax burden as 
the reason for failing to declare their activity. Interestingly, 9.3% of the participants 
argued that they see no reason for paying taxes since the state does not give anything 
in return. 
The last two issues examined were the frequency of the undeclared activities in 
question and their contribution to one’s overall income. With respect to the 
frequency, undeclared workers were asked the following question: 
 
34.5
33.9
32.1
24.3
17.7
14.2
14.1
12.0
9.3
8.2
6.3
2.3
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Normal way of doing things among friends/neighbours/relatives
To help someone out
Both parties benefited
Lack of formal employment
It was not worth to declare it
Buyer insisted
Common practice for this area/sector
Tax burden
Defiance to the state
Complicated bureaucratic procedures
Higher fees in the informal sector
Other
Thinking about the most significant undeclared work you just mentioned, did 
you carry out this activity only once or a few times or do you carry it out with 
certain regularity? 
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As Figure 25 reveals, such activities are most often done with some recurrence. Six 
out of ten undeclared workers reported that the activity in question was being 
conducted a few times during the year. In one quarter of identified cases the task was 
being repeated with certain regularity, while only 8.9% of the research participants 
stated that the particular activity took place just once.  
Figure 25 Frequency of the most important undeclared activity, % of respondents 
admitting participation from the labour supply side 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Since in most cases the activity was done on an occasional basis, the issue of income 
had to be approached with caution. To get comparable findings, the respondents 
were therefore asked about income per hour from this activity (in national currency): 
 
A few times
61%
With certain regularity
24%
Just once
9%
Refusal/DK
7%
1APPROXIMATELY, how much did you get per hour on average for this activity? 
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Most people were not willing to share this information with the interviewer, which 
therefore resulted in 42.5% of faulty answers (see Figure 26). Yet, since a considerable 
proportion of undeclared workers eventually gave the answer, this question fulfilled 
its purpose as it provided at least some information on undeclared earnings. Before 
starting, it is important to stress that the average net earnings per hour in Croatia was 
HRK 32.98 for the period January-October 2015 (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2015). 
As Figure 26 shows, at least 30% of the undeclared workforce in Croatia is 
significantly under-paid in comparison to the individuals working inside the formal 
realm. Some  6.7% of the respondents received less than HRK 15 per hour, while a 
further 22.7% were earning between HRK 15 and HRK 25 per hour.  
Figure 26 Price per hour (in HRK) for the most important undeclared activity, % of 
respondents admitting participation from the labour supply side 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Yet, there is also a non-negligible group of undeclared workers earning above the 
national average. For instance, one in ten interviewed undeclared workers said that 
0
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40
50
less than 15 15-25 26-35 36-50 more than 50 Refusal/DK
6.7
22.7
9.7
10.2 8.2
42.5
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their income from this particular activity ranged between HRK 36 and HRK 50, while for 
a slightly lower proportion (8.2%) their per hour income was above HRK 50. These 
findings again reinforce the earlier notion that there is an upper and lower tier of 
undeclared workers in Croatia. 
The last issue to be examined is the total income from undeclared work. Undeclared 
workers were asked to think about all undeclared activities conducted in that period, 
so as to answer the following question: 
 
Once again, the respondents were not particularly willing to provide the exact answer, 
which resulted in 37.3% of them either refusing to answer or arguing they do not know 
the state of affairs in this respect (see Figure 27). Taking this group aside, we can see 
that approximately one third of the participants admitted to having earned between 
1,000-5,000 HRK from undeclared work during the previous 12 months.  
Figure 27 Total net income from undeclared work in the last 12 months, % of 
respondents admitting participation from the labour supply side 
APPROXIMATELY, how much did you get in total from these undeclared 
activities in the last 12 months? 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
On the other hand, more than one in five undeclared workers stated that their total 
net income from undeclared work was below HRK 1,000, which implies that such 
activities were done on an occasional basis and not a particularly important source of 
income for these individuals. However, some 3.5% of undeclared workers earned 
more than HRK 10,000.  
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 Tax evasion in Croatia is to a great 
extent a combination of cultural 
and economic factors. 
 
 There is evidence of a high social 
embeddedness of undeclared 
work in Croatia. 
 
 Friends, colleagues and 
acquaintances are the most 
Supply side of undeclared work in Croatia – key 
facts 
 9.2% of Croatians carry out 
unregistered economic 
activities, with men more likely 
to work undeclared than 
women.  
 
 Undeclared work is most 
common among unemployed 
and self-employed individuals. 
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6 Personal connections and their role in solving everyday problems in 
Croatia 
Compared with undeclared work and under-declared work, relatively little attention 
has been given in previous studies to the use of personal connections to get things. 
This chapter summarises the most important findings. The first section elaborates the 
demand side of this practice, with particular emphasis on the incidence and 
pervasiveness of such behaviour in 13 different spheres of life. This is followed by an 
overview of the supply side in section 6.2. The last section discusses the results of the 
logit modelling, which was applied so at to understand demographic and socio-
economic determinants of this phenomenon in Croatia.  
6.1 Pulling strings to have things done – an overview of the situation in Croatia 
To understand the use of personal connections to get things done, 13 situations were 
focused upon in which the illicit circumvention of rules and norms most commonly 
happens, according to the research studies on this phenomenon around the world 
(see Onoshchenko & Williams, 2013). Each was separately discussed with the 
respondents in order to see if they have relied on personal connections in any of 
them, why they decided to bypass standard procedures in such situations, as well as 
to understand who provided the favour and how they compensated the person who 
helped them.  
To gain insight into the pulling string practice, the following question was posed:  
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The following situations were discussed: medical services (skipping queue, getting 
better examination, surgery); solving problems with the law enforcement authorities 
(traffic police, customs); finding a job; education (places in higher 
education/obtaining degree/diploma, etc.); legal services and courts; everyday 
services at better quality or better price (bank services, hairdressers, etc.); repairs 
(housing, garages, car); tickets for events (theatre, concerts); hobbies and 
entertainment (resorts, travelling tickets); consumer goods (excluding foodstuffs); 
communicating with local authorities in one’s business matters (e.g. delaying tax 
payment); foodstuffs; and speeding up bureaucratic procedures (e.g. at the municipal 
hall). It should be also mentioned that every respondent was also allowed to add any 
other situations in which they achieved advantage in such a manner, but which were 
not on the list. 
In total, 30.8% of the participants admitted to having asked someone a favour in at 
least one of these spheres. Table 8  shows that Croatians most often circumvent 
procedures related to medical services, with 17% of participants admitting to have 
used personal connections in order to skip the queue, get better medical 
examinations or shorten the waiting time for surgery at least once during the prior 
12-month period.  
  
Yes No 
Refusal/D
K 
Have you in the last twelve months asked anyone for a favour/help using 
connections in any of the following spheres? 
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Table 8 Pulling strings in various spheres of public life in Croatia, % of surveyed 
individuals 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
The second most frequent situation in which Croatians used pulling strings to get 
things was for various repairs. This is not surprising having in mind that exactly this 
area of activity was also recognised as being highly prone to undeclared work. Some 
12% of Croatians use informal methods even to search for people that would conduct 
repair services for their houses/apartments, cars and/or electronic advices. 
The results presented in Table 8 further reveal that a non-negligible part of 
population circumvents rules when searching for employment for themselves or 
members of their family. Some 9.1% of the surveyed individuals admitted to have 
asked people to assist them in getting a job. This is followed by reliance on personal 
connections to get everyday services at better quality or better price, reported by 
6.2% of the respondents. All other spheres seem not to be particularly prone to this 
type of misconduct. For instance, only 4% of citizens solve problems with the law 
Medical services: skipping queue, getting better examination, surgery 17.0 81.4 1.6 
Solving problems with the law enforcing authorities: traffic police, customs 4.0 94.7 1.3 
Finding a job 9.1 89.1 1.8 
Education: places in higher education/ obtaining degree/diploma etc. 1.9 96.7 1.4 
Legal services and courts 2.8 95.7 1.5 
Everyday services at better quality or better price (bank services, hairdressers…) 6.2 92.3 1.5 
Repairs (housing, garages, car) 12.0 86.7 1.3 
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts 4.3 94.4 1.3 
Hobbies and entertainment, resorts, travelling tickets 3.6 95.1 1.3 
Consumer goods excl. foodstuffs 3.5 95.2 1.3 
Communicating with local authorities in your business matters (e.g. delaying tax 
payment) 
2.7 96.0 1.3 
Foodstuffs 4.5 94.2 1.3 
Speeding up bureaucratic procedures (e.g. at the municipal hall) 4.3 94.4 1.3 
Other 0.5 97.6 1.9 
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enforcement authorities in this way, while only 2.8% of them apply this method to 
circumvent procedures related to legal services and courts. Yet, this does not mean 
that these fields are not prone to dishonest behaviour, as the practice of pulling 
strings is just one type of illegitimate conduct related to public affairs. Other related 
practices, such as corruption, however, were not evaluated by the survey. 
For each situation for which they admitted to circumventing the rules, the 
respondents were asked to identify the reason for such behaviour. Figure 28 presents 
the findings, illustrating the proportion of people mentioning each rationale at least 
once (i.e. for at least one of the offered domains). The findings reveal that 
dissatisfaction with the time they have to wait to get a product or service is by far the 
most frequent reason for Croatians to pull strings. Four out of ten respondents 
mentioned this for at least one of the spheres of public life in which they relied on 
help from people. This is followed by endeavours to reduce the final price, which was 
identified by 29.1% of the survey participants as the key motivation to disobey rules 
and norms.  
Figure 28 Most frequent reasons to use personal connections in Croatia, % of 
individuals who admitted pulling strings 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
The lack of information was the main reason to ask a favour for 22.4% of the 
identified violators, while 19.5% of them did so in order to improve quality of the 
good or service in question. Interestingly, one in ten people complained that at least 
once they were forced to pull strings simply because the existing rules and laws were 
not enforced in practice. In other words, those people argued that otherwise they 
would not have got the service they were entitled to. Finally, there is also a non-
negligible proportion of individuals using this practice simply to maintain social 
contact with people (7.7%), which therefore indicates a considerable level of  
embeddedness of this practice in Croatian culture. 
To further understand pulling strings, for each of the areas in which they admitted 
reliance of personal connections, the respondents were also asked the following 
question: 
40.2
29.1
22.4
19.5
17.2
14.4
10.7
7.7
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
To receive services without queuing
To reduce the final price
To get information
To improve quality
To circumvent rules/laws/bureaucracy
To be introduced to useful people
To make rules/ laws work
To maintain connections
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The list of potential providers of the favour was offered to every participant, but 
possible responses were not limited solely to this list. As Figure 29 reveals, friends are 
most frequently asked for favours. Almost six out of ten survey participants asking for 
a favour to have things done did so from their friends.  
Figure 29 The overview of people who helped/did a favour, % of individuals who 
admitted pulling strings 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
The second most important source of help was relatives, cited by 30% of the 
respondents circumventing rules and procedures. Neighbours provided assistance to 
18.4%, while colleagues did so for 13.1%. Every fourth person asking for a favour had 
at least one experience in which they did not use a close social tie (e.g., friends of 
friends, acquaintances). 
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For each identified case of the use of personal connections, the respondents were 
asked the following question: 
 
In this case, a definite list of four possible outcomes was given. The potential 
compensations included: gift; cash; a favour for a favour (quid pro quo); and verbal 
gratitude only (i.e. just ‘thank you’). Figure 30 reports the results. Over two-thirds 
(68.2%) of instances involved merely verbal gratitude expressed to the provider of the 
favour/help. In 24.3% of situations a favour was offered in return. Yet, although they 
are not as often as one would expect, transactions including material gain for the 
accomplice are far from being exceptions in Croatia. One in five people relying on 
assistance to circumvent rules/laws/procedures repaid their gratitude with a gift and 
one if five gave money to the provider. 
Figure 30 The overview of given compensations, % of individuals who admitted 
pulling strings 
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How did you reward/compensate your connection for the favour/help received? 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
 
6.2 Frequency and distribution of personal connections from the supply side 
To examine this from the supply side, respondents were asked whether they did a 
favour to/helped someone in any of the 13 areas introduced before. Those who 
admitted such a conduct were then asked why they did so, who was the person they 
helped and how they were compensated for this. This sections reports the most 
important findings. Since the questions asked in this part of the survey were 
essentially identical to the ones related to the demand (up to semantic alterations 
regarding the subject and object), we skip them here. Instead, only the summarised 
results are presented and discussed, following the same approach as in section 6.1.  
In total, 20.2% of the survey respondents admitted to helping someone in at least one 
of the offered areas. On the whole, the results on incidences of providing help/doing 
favours to circumvent rules and norms in various spheres, which are summarised in 
Table 9, to a great extent confirm the state of affairs revealed in the previous section. 
This particular type of misbehaviour in Croatia is very much related to medical 
services and the search for a job, as well as when one wants to get in touch with a 
reliable mechanic and/or handyperson. 
Taking advantage of their own position to help other people find a job was admitted 
by 14.1% of the participants, thus being the most frequent area in which Croatians do 
favours for others. Assistance in finding a mechanic and/or handyperson during the 
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12-month period before the survey was reported by 13.5% of citizens, while 10.5% of 
them helped someone to skip a queue or to get better treatment in hospitals.  
Table 9 Doing favours in various spheres of public life in Croatia, % of surveyed 
individuals 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Besides these, Croatians also frequently assist other people to get services at better 
quality or a better price, which was the situation reported by 7.1% of the survey 
participants. When it comes to other spheres of life, we can emphasise the acquisition 
of foodstuffs (6.1%), as well as the purchase of tickets (5.4%) and administration of 
events related to entertainment (5.7%) as activities in which Croatians also regularly 
provide their help. 
Turning to the main reasons for helping other people, the results are somewhat 
different than in the case of the demand for favours. Figure 31 reveals that providing 
  Yes No 
Refusal/D
K 
Medical services: skipping queue, getting better examination, surgery 10.5 88.5 1.0 
Solving problems with the law enforcing authorities: traffic police, customs 4.3 94.7 1.0 
Finding a job 14.1 85.1 0.8 
Education: places in higher education/ obtaining degree/diploma etc. 3.8 95.2 1.0 
Legal services and courts 3.2 95.8 1.0 
Everyday services at better quality or better price (bank services, hairdressers…) 7.1 91.9 1.0 
Repairs (housing, garages, car) 13.5 85.7 0.8 
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts 5.4 93.6 1.0 
Hobbies and entertainment, resorts, travelling tickets 5.7 93.3 1.0 
Consumer goods excl. foodstuffs 4.9 94.1 1.0 
Communicating with local authorities in your business matters (e.g. delaying tax 
payment) 
2.9 96.3 0.8 
Foodstuffs 6.1 92.8 1.1 
Speeding up bureaucratic procedures (e.g. at the municipal hall) 4.8 94.0 1.2 
Other 0.7 97.2 2.1 
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essential information was the most frequently identified motivation on the part of the 
suppliers. Almost 30% of the individuals who admitted doing favours justified their 
behaviour this way for at least one of the occasions in which they provided assistance. 
Reduction of the final price was the second most frequent motivation (cited by 24%).  
Figure 31 Most frequent reasons to provide help/assistance in Croatia, % of 
individuals who admitted doing favours 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Other common rationales include circumvention of rules/laws/bureaucracy, which was 
mentioned by 21.3%, as well as introduction of their friends/relatives/colleagues to 
useful people (20.9%). It is also important to note that every tenth individual 
providing assistance to other people did it simply to maintain connection, which 
confirms the earlier impression of high embeddedness of this practice in Croatian 
culture.  
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When it comes to who they helped, the findings in Figure 32 completely mirror the 
situation encountered when this practice was examined from the demand-side. Two 
out of three identified providers did a favour for a friend and as before, relatives are 
the second most frequent group who are helped by almost every fourth encountered 
provider of illegitimate assistance. 
Figure 32 The overview of people who received a favour, % of individuals who 
admitted doing favours 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
On the other hand, the remaining three groups were not recognised as particularly 
frequent recipients of favours; 14.5% had helped a neighbour at least once, 9.8% did 
for a colleague, while 11.4% had no firm social tie with the provider. 
The results on the received compensation, presented in  
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Figure 33, again reflect the demand-side. Three-quarters of providers of assistance 
asserted that the person they helped simply expressed verbal gratitude, without 
giving any material compensation. A further 19.8% either expected the favour to be 
returned in future or some particular help was given in return for an earlier favour. 
However, material rewards for given favours do exist. Such instances mostly comprise 
gifts, while cash payments are much less common, with7.6% of individuals who did a 
favour for somebody during the prior 12 months receiving money, while 11.4% were 
rewarded with a gift. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33 The overview of received compensations, % of individuals who admitted 
doing favours 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
 
6.3 Factors explaining propensity to rely on personal connections in Croatia 
In order to get an insight into demographic and socio-economic drivers of pulling 
string practices in Croatia, we once again apply logit analyses. This is done by 
modelling only the propensity of Croatians to engage in such behaviour, thus leaving 
aside likely differences between numerous spheres in which one can rely on personal 
connections. To be precise, for the purpose of the analyses conducted in this section 
we only distinguish two groups of citizens: individuals who completely denied 
participation in pulling strings (for all offered spheres) and those who admitted this 
(for one or more of the spheres).  
Therefore, the dependent variable for the demand-side is a binary indicator denoting 
whether (or not) the individual asked for any type of favour during the 12-month 
period preceding the survey. Likewise, the second dependent variable indicates 
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whether (or not) the individual helped anybody to circumvent rules and regulations, 
regardless of the circumstances in which this occurred. Besides scrutinising the effect 
of individuals’ personal characteristics in this respect, the intention was also to see if 
there is any link between undeclared work and pulling string practices in Croatia. For 
that reason, indicators of participation in undeclared work (i.e. demand and supply 
side of the phenomenon) were included as explanatory variables in the accompanying 
logit models. Recall that both these variables were used as dependent variables in the 
statistical analyses presented earlier in this report (see section 3.2 and section 5.2). 
The inclusion of these two covariates restricted the list of potential other explanatory 
variables owing to collinearity issues. While some of the variables used in chapters 3 
and 5 had to be completely omitted for this reason, some others were replaced with 
instrumental variables. To be exact, employment status was excluded this time due to 
substantial association with participation in undeclared work (see section 5.2). On the 
other hand, self-assessed financial position was replaced by the indicator of net 
income from formal work. Since these two variables give quite comparable 
information, the decision was made to include the latter to mitigate problems with 
multicollinearity. 
What is more, some variables used earlier in this report were not suitable in this case 
given the differences between the two types of behaviour in question (i.e. undeclared 
work and pulling strings). For instance, there is no theoretical reason to expect that 
one’s decision to rely on personal connections will depend on tax morale, perception 
regarding the share of population engaged in undeclared work, perceived detection 
risk nor expected sanction if caught in undeclared work. Therefore, these four variables 
were also excluded from the analyses.  
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However, this enabled inclusion of one variable that was previously omitted owing to 
multicollinearity issues, but which might play an important role, namely household 
size, following the rational assumption that the larger number of people one needs to 
take care of (e.g. children and elderly) implies a higher need for reliance on 
connections.  
Finally, demographic and geographic aspects of pulling string practices were 
evaluated using the same four variables as before. Therefore, the following 
explanatory variables were included in the analyses: age; gender; region; type of 
community; household size; net income from formal employment; indicator of 
participation in undeclared work from the demand size; and indicator of supply of 
undeclared goods and services. As before, a multiple imputation technique was 
applied to address the issue of missing values. 
The results presented in Table 10 reveal a significant association between undeclared 
work and pulling string practices in Croatia. Individuals buying goods and services on 
an undeclared basis are statistically more likely to ask someone for a favour, as well to 
do favours than those who do not use informal means of payment when acquiring 
goods and services. Those participating in undeclared work are also more likely to ask 
for, as well as to provide, a favour than individuals who do not work undeclared. 
However, it must be stressed that purchasers of undeclared goods and services have 
a stronger inclination to participate in pulling string practices than those who work on 
an undeclared basis. This can easily be seen by comparing the magnitude of the 
accompanying coefficients in Table 10.  
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There are also other factors significantly associated with pulling strings to circumvent 
processes and procedures. The statistical analyses reveals no difference between 
genders, suggesting  that women do not differ from men when it comes to asking for 
and doing favours. Yet, differences do exist between age groups. The logit analyses 
show that younger individuals are far more likely to both provide help and ask for 
help than older members of society. As expected, the size of one’s household is also 
a significant determinant, but only on the likelihood of asking for a favour, while it 
has no impact on propensity to help someone.   
Turning to the effect of net income, the results indicate that the practice of pulling 
strings is most common among the middle income groups. Namely, individuals 
earning between HRK 5,001 and HRK 10,000 are statistically most likely to rely on 
connections, while there is no significant difference between the remaining income 
groups. Likewise, doing favours was found to be much less inherent among the 
poorest and the richest individuals than among the mid-income earners. 
There are also significant spatial variations. Individuals from the capital, as well as 
those from Istria, Primorje and Gorski Kotar are statistically more likely to rely on 
personal connections than their counterparts from other regions of Croatia. However, 
there was no significant difference between urban and rural areas. The only significant 
coefficient in this respect is the one indicating a lower propensity of individuals living 
in large towns to do favours in comparison with the rest of population. However, the 
accompanying p-value in this case is just slightly above the threshold. 
Given that age and the tendency to purchase undeclared goods and services are 
important predictors with respect to both sides of pulling string practices, we can 
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evaluate how the probability to participate in this realm differs among the 
‘representative’ Croatian citizen with respect to their age and whether they 
purchase undeclared goods and services. For the purpose of this particular analysis, 
the representative citizen is defined using mean and modal values of the remaining 
six explanatory variables across the surveyed individuals. That is to say, the 
representative citizen is a woman from the capital who does not work on an 
undeclared basis, earns between HRK 2,500 and HRK 5,000 and shares her household 
with two persons.  
Table 10 Determinants of propensity to be engaged in pulling string activities in 
Croatia, results of the logit model 
  Pulling strings to have things 
done 
Doing favours 
  
  
Female 0.132 (0.115) -0.117 (0.144) 
   
Age -0.010** (0.004) -0.014*** (0.004) 
   
Household size (RC: one person) 
  
Two persons 0.411* (0.168) 0.027 (0.222) 
Three persons 0.387* (0.188) 0.119 (0.234) 
Four or more people 0.566** (0.178) 0.018 (0.227) 
   
Net income (RC: less than HRK 2,500) 
  
HRK 2,500-5,000 0.236 (0.135) 0.572*** (0.171) 
HRK 5,001-10,000 0.389* (0.179) 0.488* (0.238) 
More than HRK 10,000 0.240 (0.474) 0.741 (0.604) 
   
Working on an undeclared basis 0.461* (0.196) 0.653** (0.226) 
   
Purchasing undeclared goods and services 1.457*** (0.123) 1.293*** (0.151) 
   
Type of community (RC: rural area or village) 
  
Small or middle sized town 0.040 (0.130) -0.088 (0.162) 
Large town -0.261 (0.163) -0.431* (0.203) 
   
Region (RC: Zagreb and surroundings) 
  
North Croatia -0.734*** (0.193) -0.751** (0.248) 
Slavonia -0.862*** (0.195) -1.001*** (0.269) 
      
128 | P a g e  
 
Lika and Banovina -0.504* (0.241) -0.482 (0.308) 
Istria, Primorje and Gorski Kotar -0.312 (0.198) -0.285 (0.238) 
Dalmatia -0.795*** (0.175) -0.541* (0.212) 
   
Const -0.904** (0.300) -1.325*** (0.377) 
   
Number of observations 2,000 2.000 
Number of imputations 30 30 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.112 
Area under ROC 0.714 0.731 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses 
Significance: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
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The results graphically portrayed in Figure 34 indicate that the behaviour of 
representative Croatian citizens highly differ depending on their age and 
(non)involvement in the purchase of undeclared goods and services. For instance, 
while approximately 35% of 20-year-old individuals who do not buy products 
undeclared are expected to rely on people pulling strings for them, this rises to 70% for 
citizens who share all the same characteristics, except that they purchase goods and 
services undeclared.  
Figure 34 Probability to be engaged in pulling string activities in Croatia for a 
‘representative’ Croatian citizen depending on their age and participation in the 
undeclared economy from the demand side 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Yet, the propensity to solve problems by relying on help from friends and relatives 
constantly declines with age, as illustrated in Figure 34. To exemplify this, we can 
evaluate behaviour of three women from the capital, where all earn between HRK 
2,500 and HRK 5,000, do not participate in the undeclared realm and share their 
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household with two persons. The only difference is that the first one is 20 years old, 
the second one is 45 and the third one is aged 65. According to the presented 
analysis, the first women has a 35% chance of using personal connections, while for 
the remaining two this probability accounts for 30% and 25% respectively. The state 
of affairs is quite similar when it comes to the supply side, although the 
accompanying probabilities of participation are somewhat lower than for the demand 
side. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In most cases, the favour is 
done for/asked from a friend. 
 
 This practice rarely entails 
financial remuneration. 
 
 Most commonly, only verbal 
gratitude is expressed from the 
receipient of the favour. 
 
 Younger individuals are more 
prone to rely on this strategy of 
circumventing norms and rules. 
 
 There is a significant association 
between undeclared practices 
and reliance on personal 
connections in Croatia. 
 30.8% of the survey 
participants admitted asking 
for a favour to circumvent 
official channels, while 20.2% 
provided assistance. 
  
 Reliance on personal 
connections most commonly 
related to medical services, as 
well as when searhing for a job 
and handyperson. 
 
 Skiping queues, reducing the 
final price of services and the 
lack of essential  information 
are the most common reasons 
in Croatia to engage in this 
Pulling strings to get things done in Croatia – key 
facts 
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7 Tackling illegitimate economic activities – overview of taxpayer’s 
opinion  
The last issue evaluated is the perception of Croatian citizens regarding the most 
efficient means of fighting illegitimate activities. Equal attention is paid to the 
demand and supply side of undeclared work, as well as to envelope wages and 
pulling string practices. This chapter briefly summarises the most important findings. 
The first section focuses upon undeclared and under-declared work, while the second 
section presents the views of Croatians on appropriate strategies to reduce reliance 
on personal connections. 
7.1 Citizens’ attitudes towards various strategies for tackling undeclared work 
The inquiry about the most effective approach to combat undeclared work was 
developed in line with the existing literature on the prevalent policy strategies in the 
EU in this respect (Eurofound, 2008, 2013; Williams, 2014, 2015c; Williams and Nadin 
2012a,b; Williams et al., 2013a). Namely, the increasing number of studies on this 
matter has revealed existence of four different approaches, based on the exact goal 
of the applied measures and targeted population (Dekker et al., 2010; Sepulveda & 
Syrett, 2007; Williams et al., 2013a). 
The most straightforward strategy is eradication, which is based on the increased 
endeavours of the authorities to detect and punish noncompliance (Allingham & 
Sandmo, 1972; Williams & Nadin, 2012a). When it comes to indirect methods for the 
reduction of undeclared work, the most common among them are the so-called 
‘preventative measures’ (Dekker et al., 2010; Eurofound, 2013). Such measures seek 
to intercept noncompliance before it occurs, either by providing incentives to start 
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activities inside the formal economy for new entrants or by limiting the potentials for 
illegitimate behaviour.  
There is also a group of ‘curative measures’, namely those encouraging individuals 
and firms already working on an undeclared basis to formalise their activities 
(Eurofound, 2008; Williams et al., 2013). Finally, ‘commitment measures’ include 
awareness raising and education campaigns that seek to increase tax morale of 
citizens and consequently foster voluntary compliance (Eurofound, 2008, 2013).  
To see what citizens in Croatia think in this respect, a set of the most common 
individual measures from each of these four policy approaches was chosen16. Survey 
respondents were then given a set of statements, where each statement links one 
particular policy measure with its potential effect. The participants were asked to 
express their level of agreement with those statements on a Likert scale, with values 
ranging from ‘1’ (strongly disagree) to ‘5’ (strongly agree). The exact question 
was structured as follows: 
 
The odd number of categories within the scale was given on purpose to allow neutral 
attitudes (i.e. answer ‘3’). In addition, the ordering of statements was randomised 
                                                          
16 Eleven measures were evaluated in total. The exact explanation for the choice of policy measures is 
beyond the scope of this report, but a curios reader is advised to consult Williams (2014). 
Now I would like to know your level of agreement with the following 
statements. For each of them please tell me to what extent you agree or 
disagree with the statement: ‘1’ means “strongly disagree” and ‘5’ 
means “strongly agree”. 
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so as to avoid suggestions with respect to the importance of measures. Table 11 
reports the findings. To ease comprehension of the results, the most frequent answer 
on each statement is highlighted in red.  
On the whole, the survey respondents widely agreed with the majority of statements, 
therefore supporting a mixture of diverse policy strategies (see Table 11). The only 
exception is the issue of increased penalties; this idea seems to be mainly opposed by 
Croatians. Only 19% of the surveyed individuals strongly agreed that increasing 
penalties up to imprisonment would be an effective way of tackling undeclared and 
under-declared work, while almost 30% strongly disagreed with this statement. On 
the other hand, citizens generally advocate more inspections on the employers’ 
premises. More than 60% of the surveyed individuals argued that increased 
repression towards employers would have a positive effect in this respect. At the 
same time, only 7.8% of the participants did not agree that this would be a correct 
way forward. 
The findings also reveal that certain changes in the work of the Tax Administration 
might result in increased compliance, at least in the opinion of the citizens. This 
primarily relates to a less harsh approach towards tax evasion by mistake, as 38% of 
the surveyed participants strongly believed that a significant improvement in this 
respect can be achieved.   
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  1 
strongl
y 
disagre
e 
2 3 4 
5 
strongl
y agree 
Refusal  
Do not 
know 
1 
If people were better informed on 
how government is spending 
public money, they would be 
more willing to pay taxes. 
18.4 11.5 21.9 17.8 27.6 1.1 1.7 
2 
Ensuring a sense of fairness in 
how people are treated by the tax 
authorities would reduce evasion 
of taxes and social contributions. 
7.5 9.5 21.3 26.5 33.2 0.8 1.2 
3 
If people had greater trust in 
government, they would be more 
willing to pay their taxes. 
10.9 9.7 20.8 21.5 34.5 1.1 1.5 
4 
Telling consumers about the 
negative consequences of 
undeclared work (e.g., no insurance 
cover, no guarantees that health 
and safety regulations have been 
followed, no legal recourse) would 
reduce where they use it. 
11.9 14.2 25.9 23.5 21.6 1.0 1.9 
5 
Specialised support and advice for 
those who are considering moving 
from undeclared to formal work 
would reduce undeclared work. 
11.2 12.8 24.5 23.7 24.3 1.1 2.4 
6 
Tax evasion would be reduced if 
the tax authorities make it easier 
for people to pay their taxes, e.g. 
through providing pre-filled tax 
returns. 
11.3 12.5 22.3 23.4 27.4 1.3 1.8 
7 
Making it easier to legitimately do 
small or occasional jobs would 
reduce undeclared work. 
6.7 7.8 22.5 27.1 32.6 1.5 1.8 
8 
Undeclared work would be 
reduced if people were allowed to 
deduct from the taxes they owe 
some of the costs of paying for 
household services (e.g., 
babysitting, cleaning, elderly care, 
cooking, gardening, tutoring). 
6.0 8.1 19.3 26.4 36.9 1.8 1.5 
9 
More inspections are required at 
employers’ premises to tackle 
the problem with undeclared 
work. 
7.8 8.3 20.1 22.5 38.0 2.2 1.1 
10 
Increasing penalties up to 
imprisonment for people caught 
doing undeclared work is likely to 
reduce its prevalence. 
29.3 13.1 17.5 18.1 19.0 1.7 1.3 
11 
If the Tax Office was encouraging 
to those who have difficulty 
6.3 7.4 20.2 24.5 38.0 1.8 1.8 
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Table 11 Taxpayers’ attitude towards various strategies for tackling undeclared work 
in Croatia, % of survey respondents  
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
Croatians also widely support change in the way the tax authorities treat taxpayers. 
Explicitly, every third participant strongly agreed with the statement that ensuring a 
sense of fairness in how people are treated by the tax authorities would reduce 
evasion of taxes and social contributions. Furthermore, 26.5% of the participants 
agreed to a certain extent with this idea (i.e. answer ‘4’), thus suggesting that it 
would be quite beneficial if the Tax Administration pursues collaboration rather than 
mere coercion. 
There are also some other results suggesting that a lot can be done by improving the 
invisible psychological contract between the state and citizens, primarily with respect 
to trust in public institutions. For instance, 34.5% of the participants strongly agreed 
with the notion that higher trust in the government would increase voluntary 
compliance among taxpayers, while only 10.9% completely disagreed with this 
statement.  
Yet a much lower level of agreement was reached in the case of the public budget 
transparency. Some 45% were certain that this indirect strategy for tackling 
undeclared work would yield desirable results, while 30% did not share such a belief. 
A further 21.9% were not certain about the exact effect of increased transparency in 
public spending. 
meeting their obligations through 
no fault of their own the tax 
evasion would be reduced. 
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Croatian citizens widely believe that there is a significant room for improvement in 
the business environment. Most were certain that making it easier to legitimately do 
small or occasional jobs would reduce undeclared work. Almost one third strongly 
agreed with this statement, while a further 27.1% were fairly confident that this would 
indeed be a good way forward. On the other hand, only 14.5% of the participants 
disagreed with this idea. 
Finally, there seems to be a slightly lower support for awareness raising campaigns 
targeting consumers, as well as for specialised advisory services for those considering 
shifting from undeclared to declared work. For instance, in most cases respondents 
were not certain about the effectiveness of the awareness raising campaigns, as 
illustrated in Table 11. Instead, the surveyed individuals were more confident that 
various tax deductions would result in a lower demand for undeclared goods and 
services. Namely, 36.9% of the respondents strongly agreed that this would be a 
correct strategy to combat tax evasion and further 26.4% agreed to a certain extent. 
To simplify the comparison of perception towards these policy approaches, we also 
calculated the average level of support for each of the eleven suggested measures. 
The results presented in Figure 35 confirm that the strategy of increased penalties 
does not enjoy widespread support among Croatians. Indeed, this specific measure 
received an average rating of 2.84, which is by far the lowest score among the offered 
policy measures.  
Although having somewhat higher average rating, increased public budget 
transparency also seems not to be an effective tool for reducing tax evasion in the 
eyes of Croatian citizens. A similar conclusion can be drawn in the case of awareness 
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raising campaigns targeting consumers of undeclared goods and services, with a 
mean score of 3.3. 
Figure 35 Average support for the chosen policy measures (undeclared work) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
On the other hand, the changes in the way the tax administration operates was 
recognised as a highly effective policy approach. The strategy of more collaboration 
and less coercion on the part of tax inspectors received the highest average rating 
(3.84), while increasing fairness in the treatment by the tax administration also 
received quite a high level of support (3.7). Other measures with substantial average 
3.84
2.84
3.77
3.83
3.74
3.45
3.38
3.30
3.61
3.70
3.25
1 2 3 4 5
If the Tax Office was encouraging to those who have difficulty meeting their obligations through
no fault of their own the tax evasion would be reduced.
Increasing penalties up to imprisonment for people caught doing undeclared work is likely to
reduce its prevalence.
More inspections are required at employers’ premises to tackle the problem with undeclared 
work.
Undeclared work would be reduced if people were allowed to deduct from the taxes they owe
some of the costs of paying for household services (e.g., babysitting, cleaning, elderly care,
cooking, gardening, tutoring).
Making it easier to legitimately do small or occasional jobs would reduce undeclared work.
Tax evasion would be reduced if the tax authorities make it easier for people to pay their taxes,
e.g. through providing pre-filled tax returns.
Specialised support and advice for those who are considering moving from undeclared to formal
work would reduce undeclared work.
Telling consumers about the negative consequences of undeclared work (e.g., no insurance
cover, no guarantees that health and safety regulations have been followed, no legal recourse)
would reduce where they use it.
If people had greater trust in government, they would be more willing to pay their taxes.
Ensuring a sense of fairness in how people are treated by the tax authorities would reduce
evasion of taxes and social contributions.
If people were better informed on how government is spending public money, they would be more
willing to pay taxes.
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support include tax deductions for various household services (3.83), increased 
inspections at employers’ premises (3.77) and the reduction of administrative 
burden for small and occasional jobs (3.74). 
7.2 The way forward in reducing reliance on personal connections in Croatia – 
summary of the survey respondents’ perceptions 
An identical approach to the above was repeated in the case of pulling strings to 
circumvent official channels to get things done. Explicitly, each respondent was 
offered a set of statements and asked to express their level of agreement with them 
on a 5-point Likert scale: 
 
However, this time the list of possible conducts was limited only to three rationales 
for people to circumvent rules by pulling strings. These were: administrative barriers; 
lack of  information on the required procedures; and unequal treatment by public 
institutions.      
Table 12 Taxpayers’ attitude towards various strategies for reducing reliance on 
personal connections in Croatia, % of survey respondents 
  1 
strongl
y 
disagre
e 
2 3 4 
5 
strongl
y agree 
Refusal  Do not 
know 
1 
Complicated bureaucratic 
procedures are one of the main 
8.9 8.6 21.7 20.5 38.1 0.8 1.4 
Now I would like to know your level of agreement with the following 
statements. For each of them please tell me to what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the statement: ‘1’ means strongly disagree and ‘5’ means 
strongly agree 
      
140 | P a g e  
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
The results presented in Table 12 suggest that there is a slightly higher level of 
agreement among Croatians in this respect than was the case with measures to tackle 
undeclared and under-declared work. One can see that people mostly tended to 
agree with all three statements, although it seems that the issue of fairness is 
particularly important in this respect from the perspective of citizens. Every second 
respondent expressed a firm belief that ensuring the sense of fair treatment in public 
and government institutions would reduce the use of connections. Additional 22.1% 
of the participants were somewhat certain that reliance on personal connections can 
be reduced by increasing fairness of the system. On the other hand, less than 4.9% of 
the participants completely refuted this idea, while further 6.5% were to a certain 
degree confident that the given causal relationship does not hold true in Croatia. 
At the same time, the simplification of administrative procedures was recognised as a 
praiseworthy step forward by almost 60% of respondents; 38.1% of the participants 
argued that complicated bureaucratic procedures are one of the main reasons for 
resorting to the use of connections in Croatia, while a further 20.5% expressed 
moderate persuasion regarding the validity of this assertion. On the other hand, only 
reasons for resorting to the use of 
connections 
2 
Ensuring the sense of fair treatment 
in public and government 
institutions would reduce the use of 
connections 
4.9 6.5 16.0 22.1 48.6 0.7 1.2 
3 
If people were better informed of the 
procedures in place, they would not 
resort to the use of connections to 
achieve certain things 
11.8 13.1 21.3 20.5 30.5 1.1 1.7 
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17.5% of the surveyed individuals expressed more or less negative attitude in this 
respect, while 21.7% were neutral. 
Although the positive effect of improvements in delivery of essential information in 
this respect was also recognised by a majority of Croatians, agreement was much 
lower than with the previous two statements. Even though 50% of the participants 
partially or completely agreed that this would reduce the use of connections, almost 
one quarter did not share this opinion at all. In addition, there was also a non-
negligible portion of individuals who were not certain about the exact effect this 
change would have on prevalence of personal connections. 
Figure 36 Average support for the chosen policy responses (personal connections) 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on the representative survey of 2,000 individuals in 
Croatia 
This dispersion is additionally illuminated by Figure 36, which provides average 
ratings for these three statements. As is noticeable, the improved provision of 
information received an average rating of 3.46, which is quite low in comparison with 
the remaining two claims. For instance, simplification of bureaucratic procedures has 
3.72
4.05
3.46
1 2 3 4 5
Complicated bureaucratic procedures are one of the main reasons for resorting to the use of
connections
Ensuring the sense of fair treatment in public and government institutions would reduce the use
of connections
If people were better informed of the procedures in place, they would not resort to the use of
connections to achieve certain things
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the average rating of 3.72, thus indicating high level of agreement among citizens 
with respect to effectiveness of such an approach towards reduction of reliance on 
personal connections. As expected, the idea that the phenomenon of pulling strings 
to have things done would be efficiently reduced by ensuring the sense of fair 
treatment in public and government institutions received the greatest average rating 
of 4.05.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The fight against undeclared work 
should be concetrated on 
reducing the gap between the 
state and citizens.  
 
 Ensuring a sense of fair treatment 
in public institutions is recognised 
as the most effective approach to 
reduce the use of connections. 
 
 People also generally agree that 
simplification of bureaucratic 
procedures and enhanced 
provision of information would be 
a significant step forward in 
reducing reliance on personal 
connections. 
 According to espondents, the 
tax administration should shift 
the focus from coercion to 
collaboration.  
 
 There is a need to increase the 
number of inspections in the 
opinion of Croatian citizens. 
 
 Increasing penalties for 
offenders was not recognised by 
citizens as a good way forward. 
 
 Tax deductions for purchasers 
have a potential to reduce 
demand for undeclared goods 
and services according to the 
The most effective approach for tackling illegitimate 
economic practices in Croatia from the perspective of 
citizens – key facts 
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